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Patent	Transfer	And	The	Bundle	of	Sticks	by	Andrew	C.	Michaels*	Abstract	In	the	age	of	the	patent	troll,	patents	are	often	licensed	and	transferred.		A	transferred	patent	may	have	been	subject	to	multiple	complex	license	agreements.		It	cannot	be	that	such	a	transfer	wipes	the	patent	clean	of	all	outstanding	license	agreements;	the	licensee	must	keep	the	license.		But	at	the	same	time,	it	cannot	be	that	the	patent	transferee	becomes	a	party	to	a	complex	and	sweeping	license	agreement	–	the	contract	–	merely	by	virtue	of	acquiring	one	patent.		This	article	attempts	to	separate	the	in	personam	aspects	of	a	license	agreement	from	its	effects	on	the	underlying	in	rem	patent	rights,	using	Hohfeld’s	framework	of	jural	relations	and	the	“bundle	of	sticks”	conception	of	property.		A	license	agreement	can	diminish	(but	not	add	to)	the	bundle	of	in	rem	patent	rights	initially	granted	by	the	USPTO,	and	a	new	patent	owner	takes	only	the	diminished	bundle	of	rights	upon	transfer,	given	that	one	cannot	transfer	more	than	what	one	owns.		The	bundle	theory	can	provide	greater	clarity	regarding	the	extent	to	which	licenses	“run	with	the	patent,”	and	also	has	implications	for	how	patent	transfer	affects	other	doctrines	such	as	patent	exhaustion,	FRAND	obligations,	prior	user	rights,	and	laches.	
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Patent	Transfer	And	The	Bundle	of	Sticks	
Introduction	No	figure	in	contemporary	patent	law	has	drawn	more	ire	than	the	“patent	troll.”1		The	bête	noire	of	the	patent	law	community,	the	so-called	troll	might	be	more	formerly	referred	to	as	a	“Non	Practicing	Entity”	(NPE)	or	“Patent	Assertion	Entity”	(PAE).2		The	troll	lies	in	wait	under	technological	bridges,	until	it	emerges	threatening	to	cast	corporations	into	a	cascade	of	patent	litigation.		But	the	troll	can	be	persuaded	to	step	aside,	to	grant	a	license,	for	a	price.		The	License	on	Transfer	(“LOT”)	Network	bills	itself	as	the	“permanent	solution	to	the	patent	troll	problem,”3	something	like	the	fabled	big	billy	goat.4		The	
1	See,	e.g.,	Kristen	Jakobsen	Osenga,	Formerly	Manufacturing	Entities:	Piercing	the	
Patent	Troll	Rhetoric,	47	CONN.	L.	REV.	435,	437	(2014)	(“Everyone	seems	to	hate	‘patent	trolls.’”);	but	see,	Edward	Lee,	Patent	Trolls:	Moral	Panics,	Motions	in	Limine,	
and	Patent	Reform,	19	STAN.	TECH.	L.	REV.	101,	101	(2016)	(“‘I	like	patent	trolls,’	Judge	Richard	Posner	confessed	to	a	group	of	patent	scholars	.	.	.	.”).	
2	Osenga,	47	CONN.	L.	REV.	at	439;	see	also,	Sara	Jeruss,	Robin	Feldman,	&	Joshua	Walker,	The	America	Invents	Act	500:	Effects	of	Patent	Monetization	Entities	on	US	
Litigation,	11	DUKE	LAW	&	TECH.	REV.	357,	358	(2012)	(“Any	discussion	of	flaws	in	the	United	States	patent	system	inevitably	turns	to	the	system’s	modern	villain:	non-practicing	entities.”);	Lee,	19	STAN.	TECH.	L.	REV.	at	103	(“In	the	extreme,	such	prejudice	leads	to	a	moral	panic	in	which	rational	policymaking	and	decision-making give way to hysteria to fight the proverbial ‘folk devil’ (substitute: patent troll).”) 
(citing STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972)). 
3 See http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works (accessed Dec. 2016). 
4 Cf. JOHN LINDLOW, TROLLS: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 131 (Reaktion Books, 2014) 
(“Probably the most famous troll is the one under the bridge in The Three Billy Goats 
Gruff.”).  In the Norwegian fable, three billy goats cross a bridge in search of food.  
Under the bridge lives a troll who threatens to eat each billy goat.  The first two billy 
goats each in turn convince the troll to save its appetite for the next, larger, billy goat 
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idea	of	the	LOT	is	that	a	group	of	companies	makes	a	pact	that	none	of	them	will	transfer	any	of	their	patents	to	a	troll.		If	any	company	breaks	the	pact,	a	license	is	automatically	granted	to	all	of	the	other	companies	in	the	group,	which	takes	effect	immediately	upon	transfer	of	the	patent	to	the	troll.		The	LOT’s	plan	to	“eliminate	the	patent	troll	threat,”5	is	thus	premised	on	the	notion	that	licenses	run	with	patents	when	transferred.		The	LOT	cannot	be	bothered	to	engage	with	the	question	of	how	or	to	what	extent	this	happens.6		But	the	question	remains:	is	the	LOT	license	a	creature	of	contract	or	of	property?		On	the	one	hand,	it	cannot	be	that	the	mere	transfer	of	a	patent	wipes	the	patent	clean	of	all	outstanding	licenses.		But	at	the	same	time,	the	LOT	agreement	is	a	complex	ten	page	contract	with	various	provisions	relating	to	bankruptcy,	third	party	beneficiaries,	costs,	governing	law,	and	other	issues.7		It	cannot	be	that	a	patent	troll	becomes	a	full	party	to	that	contract	merely	by	virtue	of	acquiring	a	single	patent	from	a	LOT	member.		So	what	“runs	with	the	patent”	must	be	something	including	the	bare	license	but	something	less	than	the	entire	contract	or	
license	agreement	creating	the	license.			Even	if	the	parties	to	a	license	agreement	attempt	to	address	this	issue	in	the	contract,	that	would	not	necessarily	settle	the	matter.		The	parties	can	agree	to	make	
following behind.  But the third billy goat is so large that it defeats the troll, thus 
permanently solving the troll problem, as the LOT purports to do.  See id. at 69-70.         
5 http://lotnet.com (accessed Dec. 2016). 
6 See Part II(E), infra. 
7 See LOT agreement, v2_0-11_24_15, at § 2.3, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, available at 
http://lotnet.com/download-lot-agreement (accessed Dec. 2016). 
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a	license	assignable.8		But	the	question	here	is	different.		The	question	here	is	when	the	licensor	transfers	a	licensed	patent,	to	what	extent	is	the	acquirer	of	the	patent	automatically	bound	by	the	obligations	in	the	license	agreement	–	to	which	the	patent	acquirer	never	agreed.9		In	other	words,	to	what	extent	does	a	license	agreement	change	the	underlying	property	rights,	and	conversely,	to	what	extent	does	it	remain	an	in	personam	agreement	between	two	contracting	parties.10	How	then	to	separate	aspects	of	the	license	agreement	which	remain	between	the	parties	to	that	agreement,	from	those	which	“run	with	the	patent?”		The	caselaw	sometimes	states	that	aspects	of	the	license	agreement	that	relate	to	the	“actual	use”	of	the	patented	invention	are	“encumbrances”	running	with	the	patent.		However,	this	theory	is	not	consistently	applied	and	is	not	particularly	coherent.		For	example,	courts	have	held	that	royalty	rights	do	not	run	with	the	patent,	though	
8 See PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979) (“It has 
long been held by federal courts that agreements granting patent licenses are personal and 
not assignable unless expressly made so.”); Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 193, 14 L. Ed. 383 (1852) (“A mere license to a party, without having his assigns 
or equivalents words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the 
grant of personal power to the licensees, and is not transferable by him to another.”). 
9 Cf. Reuben v. U.S. Air, No. 11-1235, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84038, *19 (W.D. Pa. 
June 18, 2012) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a breach of 
contract unless one is a party to that contract.”); Electron Energy Corp. v. Short, 408 Pa. 
Super. 563, 571 (1991) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a 
breach of contract unless one is a party to the contract.”); Smartran, Inc. v. Alpine 
Connections, Inc., 352 Fed. Appx. 650, 656 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
10 See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether 
express or implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state 
contract law.’”) (quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., 871 F.2d 1082, 
1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Christopher M. Newman, A License is not a “Contract not to 
Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1101, 1103 (2013) (distinguishing between “license” and “license agreement”). 
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it	is	not	clear	how	royalty	rights	received	in	exchange	for	allowing	use	of	a	patented	invention	do	not	relate	to	“actual	use”	of	that	patented	invention.		The	encumbrance	theory	is	also	inconsistent	with	the	principle	that	there	can	be	no	covenants	running	with	personal	property,	given	that	patents	are	by	statute	to	be	treated	as	having	the	attributes	of	personal	property.11	This	article	attempts	to	develop	a	better	framework	for	analysis	of	these	issues,	with	the	help	of	Hohfeld’s	framework	of	jural	relations	and	the	“bundle	of	sticks”	conception	of	property.		Under	this	theory,	a	patentee	may	give	up	one	stick	in	the	bundle,	the	right	to	exclude	the	licensee,	through	the	license	agreement.		In	Hohfeld’s	terminology,	the	license	agreement	effects	a	change	in	the	relation	between	the	patentee	and	the	licensee,	from	“Right	/	Duty,”	to	“No-Right	/	Privilege.”12		When	the	patentee	transfers	the	patent,	it	transfers	only	what	is	left	in	the	bundle	of	patent	rights,	though	the	license	agreement	or	contract	remains	between	the	original	two	parties.		This	comports	with	the	principle	that	one	cannot	transfer	what	one	no	longer	owns,	or,	nemo	dat	quod	non	habet.13			Under	the	bundle	theory	of	this	article,	the	bundle	of	patent	rights	granted	by	the	USPTO	can	be	diminished	but	not	enlarged	by	the	actions	of	a	patent	owner.		For																																																									
11 See Part I(A), infra; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal 
property”). 
 
12 See Part I(C), infra. 
 
13 See, e.g., Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 244 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 
2001) (“[The holding that] an assignee can acquire rights no greater than those held by 
the assignor is consistent with the basic principle of commercial law encapsulated in the 
Latin phrase nemo dat qui non habet. . . .  The basic concept behind nemo dat is that a 
transferee’s rights are no better than those held by his transferor.). 
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example,	though	royalty	rights	might	be	received	by	a	licensor	in	exchange	for	giving	up	one	stick	in	the	patent	bundle,	such	rights	would	not	be	considered	part	of	the	bundle	of	patent	rights,	and	so	would	not	automatically	transfer	with	the	patent.		A	patent	does	not	initially	include	a	right	to	receive	royalties,	and	a	license	agreement	cannot	operate	add	that	right	to	the	in	rem	patent	bundle.		Part	I	illustrates	the	problem,	discusses	the	divide	between	property	and	contract,	and	reviews	Hohfeld	and	the	“bundle	of	sticks”	conception	of	property.		Part	II	compares	the	bundle	theory	with	the	law	of	covenants	and	encumbrances	that	“run	with”	property	interests,	and	evaluates	aspects	of	license	agreements	under	these	two	theories,	concluding	that	the	bundle	theory	provides	a	more	coherent	explanation.		Part	III	explores	some	broader	implications	of	the	bundle	theory	for	other	doctrines	of	patent	law,	such	as	patent	exhaustion,	FRAND	commitments,	prior	user	rights,	and	laches.	
Part	I	–	Bundle	Theory	and	Hohfeld	A. Illustration	Of	The	Problem		 Consider	companies	A	and	B,	which	own	ten	patents	each,	and	enter	into	a	cross-license	agreement.		Under	the	agreement,	A	has	a	license	to	all	ten	of	B’s	patents,	and	B	has	a	license	to	all	ten	of	A’s	patents.		Then,	A	transfers	one	of	its	ten	patents	(patent	X)	to	company	C.		Does	company	C	have	a	right	to	sue	company	B	for	infringement	of	patent	X?		It	seems	clear	that	in	general	the	answer	is	no.		B	paid	for	a	license	to	patent	X	when	A	owned	that	patent.		B	should	not,	absent	contrary	
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agreement,	be	deprived	of	the	license	bargained	for,	merely	because	A	later	decided	to	transfer	the	licensed	patent.14			Courts	to	have	considered	the	question	have	generally	reached	this	result.15		The	courts	have	ruled	that	even	a	“bona	fide	purchaser”	of	a	patent	takes	the	patent	subject	to	“licenses,	of	which	he	must	inform	himself	as	best	he	can	at	his	own	risk.”16		The	intuition	is	that	the	purchaser	of	a	patent	should	recognize	the	possibility	that	licenses	on	the	patent	might	exist,	and	should	take	steps	to	investigate	whether	they	in	fact	do	exist.17	
																																																								
14 Cf. Lawrence Berger, Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 
MINN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1970) (“It was early apparent that unless agreements (contained 
in deeds or leases) respecting the use of land were binding not only upon the promisor 
(covenantor) who entered into them but also upon purchasers from him, such 
undertakings would be worthless, since otherwise they could be avoided by a mere 
transfer to a third party.”); Jay Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, 
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L. J. 231, 304 (2014) (“if a 
patentee could extinguish the benefits of a FRAND commitment by transferring the 
patent to a third party, this would lead to inequitable results”). 
 
15 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, LLC v. Panasonic Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 
(N.D. Cal. July 2, 2013). 
 
16 Jones v. Berger, 58 F. 1006, 1007 (C.C.D. Md. 1893); see also, Innovus Prime, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *16 (“This occurs whether or not an assignee had notice.”); V-
Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Colo. Mar. 
10, 2006) (“The court does not agree that the doctrine of ‘bona fide purchaser’ as urged 
by V-Formation precludes Benetton from asserting the covenant not to sue as a defense in 
this case.”).  Of course, a true “bona fide purchaser” patent assignee may have some 
claim against a patent assignor / seller who is less than forthright about the extent to 
which the patent has been license. 
 
17 See Menachem Mautner, The Eternal Triangles of The Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 116 
(1991) (“Clearly, whenever the purchaser acts with actual knowledge or presumed 
suspicion of the existence of a prior conflicting claim, the purchaser is the party best 
located to prevent the conflict by avoiding the transaction.”).  In the case of licenses, the 
purchaser would not necessarily avoid the transaction, but might just pay a lower price 
for the patent, reflecting the inability to enforce against the licensed parties.   
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But	the	more	difficult	question,	on	which	the	courts	have	been	unclear,	is:	under	what	theory	does	company	B	maintain	its	license	to	patent	X.		In	this	regard,	the	case	law	presents	at	least	two	different	possibilities.	The	first	possibility	is	that	the	license	is	an	“encumbrance”	that	attaches	to	the	patent	and	“runs	with”	the	patent	when	it	is	transferred.18		This	theory	seems	to	derive	from	the	common	law	on	covenants	that	“run	with	the	land,”19	but	its	application	to	patent	law	can	be	problematic.		What	exactly	runs	with	the	patent?		It	cannot	be	the	entire	license	agreement.		Considering	the	hypothetical	agreement	above,	it	seems	unlikely	that	given	the	mere	transfer	of	patent	X	from	A	to	C,	C	now	inherits	A’s	license	rights	to	all	ten	of	B’s	patents.		The	contract	between	A	and	B	remains	a	contract	between	A	and	B,	despite	the	transfer	of	one	patent	that	was	licensed	in	that	contract.		So	the	encumbrance	that	runs	with	the	patent	is	something	that	derives	from	the	license	agreement,	but	something	less	than	the	entirety	of	that	agreement.		This	“encumbrance”	theory	is	also	in	some	tension	with	the	principle	that	covenants	cannot	run	with	personal	property,	given	that	by	statute,	“patents	shall	have	the	attributes	of	personal	property.”20						
																																																								
18 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving 
the actual use of the patent ‘run with the patent’ and are binding on subsequent owners”) 
(citing Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 
19 See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
THE LAND” (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207. 
 
20 35 U.S.C. § 261; see also, Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. 
App. 14th 1996) (“Since a patent is to be treated as personal property, there can be no 
covenants that ‘run with’ the patent.”); In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 
2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Patents are personal property.  Real property concepts (such 
as covenants running with the land) do not apply to personal property.”). 
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The	second	possibility	is	based	on	the	general	principle	that	one	cannot	transfer	what	one	does	not	own.21		Where	a	patentee,	via	a	license	agreement,	has	already	given	up	the	right	to	exclude	a	particular	licensee,	the	patentee	cannot	then	transfer	that	right.		Using	the	“bundle	of	sticks”	analogy,22	where	a	patentee	has	already	given	up	one	stick	in	the	bundle,	the	patentee	transfers	only	what	remains.		Returning	to	the	hypothetical,	A	had	already	given	up	the	right	to	exclude	B	from	practicing	patent	X,	so	A	could	not	transfer	that	right	to	C.		A	transferred	to	C	a	diminished	bundle	of	sticks,	that	is,	only	those	sticks	that	remained	in	the	bundle.									Sometimes	aspects	of	these	two	different	theories	are	presented	within	a	single	case,	or	even	a	single	sentence.23		But	these	two	possibilities	(the	“encumbrance”	theory	and	the	“bundle”	theory)	have	significant	differences.		To	begin	with,	they	are	aesthetic	opposites;	under	the	encumbrance	theory,	something																																																									
 
21 See, e.g., Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 
1983) (explaining that it is a “principle of patent law . . . that the purchaser does not 
acquire any rights greater than those possessed by the owner of the patent”) (citing 
Featherstone v. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 F. 110, 111 (C.C.N.Y. 1892)).  
 
22 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721, 741 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (“It has long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights 
in a particular thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an 
invention – are viewed as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred 
separately.”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-36 (1990); Thomas C. 
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 
23 See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[B]ecause the owner of a patent cannot transfer an interest greater than that 
which it possesses, an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal encumbrances 
thereon.”); Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15; Paice LLC v. Hyundai 
Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *28 (D. Md. July 7, 2014) (“a patent owner 
cannot transfer an interest greater than that which it possesses, and assignees take patent 
rights subject to the legal encumbrances thereon”); see also Part II(A), infra. 
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(an	encumbrance)	is	added	to	the	patent,	whereas	under	the	bundle	theory,	something	(a	stick	or	a	right)	is	subtracted.			These	different	cognitive	frameworks	can	also	lead	to	different	practical	results.		If	the	license	agreement	is	a	contract,	and	if	the	contract	(or	part	of	it)	is	an	encumbrance	that	travels	with	the	patent,	then	a	new	patent	owner	who	fails	to	abide	by	the	contract	terms	could	potentially	be	subject	to	a	claim	for	breach	of	contract.24		By	contrast,	under	the	bundle	theory,	although	a	prior	licensee	would	have	a	license	defense	to	an	infringement	claim	by	the	new	patent	owner,	the	prior	licensee	would	not	have	a	breach	of	contract	claim,	as	the	contract	remains	between	the	original	two	parties.25			The	bounds	of	the	rights	of	the	new	patent	owner	are	also	potentially	different	under	the	two	theories.		Courts	applying	the	encumbrance	theory	have	generally	stated	or	implied	that	that	the	encumbrance	includes	aspects	of	the	license	agreement	that	relate	to	the	actual	use	of	the	patent,	or	the	patented	invention.26		
																																																								
24 See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 286 (“When a patent owner grants a license 
to another party, the license is often analyzed as a contract.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts . . . .”); 
H. Justin Pace, Note, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group 
Mergers: The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 263, 267 
(2010) (“Copyright and patent licenses are contracts and as such are interpreted according 
to state law.”); Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in 
Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012) (“This Article argues that 
the weight of judicial authority and sound policy support a contractual approach to 
license formation.”). 
 
25 See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Wi-LAN USA, Inc., No. 14-21854-CV-DMM, D.I. 165, *10 
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 2015) (“Ericsson does not have standing to maintain its claim for 
breach of contract.”). 
 
26 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving 
the actual use of the patent ‘run with the patent’ and are binding on subsequent owners”) 
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Royalty	rights	to	a	percentage	of	licensee	sales	on	a	patented	invention	would	certainly	relate	to	the	use	of	the	patented	invention,	and	possibly	use	of	the	patent	as	well.		The	encumbrance	theory	would	thus	seem	to	counsel	that	such	royalty	rights	should	run	with	the	patent,	just	as	rent	from	a	tenant	would	run	with	the	land	to	a	new	landlord.27		But	where,	as	in	the	hypothetical,	only	a	fraction	of	the	licensed	patents	are	transferred,	it	could	be	difficult	to	apportion	the	extent	to	which	royalty	benefits	shift	to	the	new	owner.			Under	the	bundle	theory,	royalty	rights	would	not	travel	with	a	patent,	absent	contrary	agreement.		This	is	because	the	bundle	of	patent	rights	granted	by	the	USPTO	did	not	include	the	right	to	receive	royalties.		The	royalty	rights	were	extracted	by	the	original	patent	owner	in	exchange	for	giving	up	the	right	to	exclude	the	licensee,	but	that	does	not	make	the	royalty	rights	part	of	the	patent	bundle.28		Under	the	bundle	theory,	an	in	personam	contract	entered	into	by	a	patent	owner	cannot	add	to	the	in	rem	bundle	of	patent	rights	transferred	to	a	subsequent	patent	owner.		Avoiding	the	apportionment	issue,	as	well	as	the	issue	of	what	does	or	does	not	relate	to	the	“actual	use”	of	the	patent	or	invention,	the	bundle	theory	gives	a	more	coherent	answer	as	to	whether	certain	aspects	of	a	license	agreement	would	travel	with	the	patent	to	a	new	owner.																																																																																																																																																																							
(citing Datatreasury, 522 F.3d 1372); Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33 
(“licensing terms not tied to the right to use a patented invention do not encumber”). 
 
27 See Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222 (“the burden of a covenant to pay rent runs with 
the land to the assignee of the tenant and the benefit runs to the successor in ownership of 
the landlord’s reversion”). 
 
28 Cf. In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *8 (“a royalty interest in a 
patent cannot be considered a covenant that runs with the land”). 
 
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 Patent	Transfer	 DRAFT	–	Dec.	2016		
	 11	
B. Sharpening	The	Property	/	Contract	Divide	In	Licenses			The	relative	clarity	of	the	bundle	theory	is	advantageous	as	compared	with	the	legal	uncertainty	of	the	encumbrance	theory.29		In	a	patent	transfer	situation,	the	parties	(transferor	and	transferee)	are	already	dealing	and	negotiating	the	transfer	of	the	patent.30		As	such,	it	matters	not	so	much	where	the	entitlement	is	placed,	but	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	where	the	entitlement	lies.31		If	the	entitlements	are	clear,	the	parties	will	more	easily	be	able	to	be	take	them	into	account	in	negotiating	the	price	of	the	patent	transfer,	or	contract	around	the	default	rule	and	transfer	additional	aspects	of	any	license	agreements.32		As	explained	in	Law	and	Economics	by	Robert	Cooter	and	Thomas	Ulen:	[B]argainers	are	more	likely	to	cooperate	when	their	rights	are	clear	and	less	likely	to	agree	when	their	rights	are	ambiguous.	.	.	.		One	
																																																								
29 Cf. Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 234 (“The rules of law about covenants running with 
the land are so complex that only a very few specialists understand them.  Sometimes 
complexity in the law is necessary.  In this particular case, it is not.”). 
 
30 Where royalties are concerned, the relevant analysis is between the patent transferor 
and transferee, assuming that the licensee will be paying the same amount either way.  
The question is just, as a default rule, who will the licensee be paying.  If the royalties do 
not run, the transferor continues to get paid.  If the royalties do run, the payments go to 
the patent transferee (the new owner) instead.   
 
31 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1, 8 (1960) (“the ultimate 
result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if 
the pricing system is assumed to work without cost”); Guido Calabresi & Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (“Recently it has been argued that on certain 
assumptions, usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality or 
economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement.”). 
  
32 Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“markets require contracting or exchange, and 
uncertainty threatens exchange”); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 68 (1992). 
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implication	of	this	finding	is	that	property	law	ought	to	favor	criteria	for	determining	ownership	that	are	clear	and	simple.33				Uncertainty	in	where	the	entitlements	lie	can	only	serve	to	complicate	matters,	creating	costs	related	to	confusion	in	negotiation,	and	potentially	even	future	disputes	leading	to	litigation.		Clear	and	simple	rights	regarding	in	rem	rules	such	as	patents	rights	can	help	to	minimize	information	costs.34		This	supports	the	idea	that	under	the	bundle	theory	of	this	article,	the	patentee	can	diminish	the	in	
rem	patent	bundle	of	patent	rights	by	entering	into	a	license	agreement,	but	cannot	add	to	that	bundle	of	rights.		Allowing	a	patentee	to	add	to	the	in	rem	bundle	of	property	rights	granted	by	the	USPTO	would	impose	significant	information	costs	on	society,	as	such	in	rem	rights	are	“against	the	world”	and	thus	impose	correlative	duties	on	everyone	else,	as	will	be	explained	further	in	the	next	subsection.	This	is	not	entirely	just	a	matter	of	default	rules.		The	parties	to	a	license	agreement	could	probably	successfully	agree	that	a	license	will	not	run	with	the	licensed	patent,	as	this	would	not	adversely	affect	a	non-party	to	the	agreement	such	as	a	bona	fide	purchaser	of	the	patent.		But	an	agreement	that	all	aspects	of	a	license	agreement	will	necessarily	bind	a	future	patent	owner	could	be	problematic.		How	would	such	an	agreement	bind	a	purchaser	of	the	patent	who	did	not	sign	the	
																																																								
33 ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (3d. ed. 2000). 
 
34 Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
773, 795 (2001) (“The disadvantages of the exclusion strategy are largely a function of 
the limitations on such rights imposed by the need to minimize the unit costs of 
processing information.  In order to keep these costs low, it is simply not possible to 
make these duties very complex or detailed.”). 
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contract	and	may	not	have	even	known	its	terms,	some	of	which	may	have	been	confidential?		The	contract	as	such	could	not	bind	the	patent	purchaser.			But	at	the	same	time,	the	licensee	is	not	a	party	to	the	patent	sale	transaction,	and	it	is	important	not	to	allow	that	transaction	to	too	severely	upset	the	rights	of	the	licensee,	who	would	expect	to	maintain	the	bargained	for	use	privileges.		The	transfer	of	the	patent	cannot	erase	the	effects	of	the	in	personam	license	agreement	on	the	underlying	in	rem	patent	rights.		As	explained	by	Thomas	Merrill	and	Henry	Smith	in	their	article	on	“The	Property/Contract	Interface”:	[W]here	we	find	legal	relations	that	are	purely	in	rem,	we	also	consistently	find	that	the	doctrine	adopts	the	form	characteristic	of	property	law	–	immutable	bright-line	rules.	.	.	.		[W]e	find	a	tendency	for	protective	and	even	notice	rules	to	become	more	difficult	to	contract	around	–	more	standardized	–	as	duty	holders	become	more	numerous	and	indefinite	and	so	closer	to	the	true	in	rem	situation.35			 Thus	to	use	the	terminology	of	Merrill	and	Smith,	license	agreements	can	be	thought	of	as	lying	along	the	interface	of	property	and	contract.36		In	furtherance	of	clarity	regarding	the	separation	of	property	and	contract	in	license	agreements,	unpacking	the	legal	rights	and	duties	at	play	in	a	patent	transfer	situation	using	Hohfeld’s	framework	jural	relations,37	can	be	helpful.38	
																																																								
35 Id. at 850. 
 
36 See id. at 849 (“Each of the four institutions we have examined involves some 
combination of in personam and in rem relations.”).  
 
37 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). 
 
38 Pierre Schlag, How To Do Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187 
(2015) (“One of the most striking aspects of Hohfeld’s work is how much its architecture 
and arguments remain relevant – even bitingly so – today.”).  See generally, Symposium 
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C. Hohfeld’s	Jural	Relations		The	bundle	of	rights	picture	of	property	has	strong	roots	in	Hohfeld’s	work	on	fundamental	jural	relations.39		The	lack	of	precision	in	court	decisions	as	to	what	runs	with	the	patent	stems	in	part	from	failure	to	distinguish	between	“license”	as	pure	change	in	jural	relation,	and	the	“license	agreement”	which,	inter	alia,	effects	that	change.40		Indeed	this	is	precisely	the	type	of	looseness	of	language	that	motivated	Hohfeld’s	articulation	of	the	jural	relations,	and	for	which	they	can	serve	as	useful	tools	for	analysis.41		In	short,	a	patent	is	often	said	to	provide	a	“right	to	
																																																																																																																																																																					
on the Work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/yale-
law-school-events/symposium-work-wesley-newcomb-hohfeld (Oct. 15, 2016).  
 
39 See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
729 (1996) (“Hohfeld’s contribution to the bundle of rights picture is quite 
understandable, since in a significant sense, he devised it, although he did not fully 
elaborate its contours.”); Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783 (explaining that 
Hohfeld’s work “directly anticipates the adoption of the bundle-of-rights metaphor 
favored by the Legal Realists”). 
 
40 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L. J. 66, 
92 n.49 (1917) (explaining that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” “is rapidly shifted 
about by lawyers and courts, -- usually even by the more careful writers, -- so as to cover 
not only more complex groups of operative facts, but also the jurial relations flowing 
either from a ‘mere permission’ or from more complex sets of facts”); see also Hohfeld, 
23 YALE L. J. at 24-25 (“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar 
inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate 
between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called ‘agreements’ of the 
parties, and the legal ‘contractual obligation’ to which those facts give rise.”). 
 
41 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 22 (“At the very outset it seems necessary to emphasize the 
importance of differentiating purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts 
that call such relations into being.”); see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 
192 (“Consider the term ‘contract.’  Sometimes it refers to the mental agreement reached 
by the parties (e.g., the mental state); at other times to the physical embodiment of that 
agreement, (e.g., the document); and, at other times, to the various rights, duties, and 
powers brought into being in virtue of reaching the agreement (e.g., the legal 
relations).”). 
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exclude,”42	and	as	such,	using	Hohfeld’s	framework,	correspondingly	provides	by	definition	that	others	have	a	“duty”	not	to	infringe.43		So	if	each	right	held	by	the	patentee	is	a	stick	in	the	bundle,	the	license	agreement	diminishes	the	size	of	the	patent	bundle.		The	first	thing	to	grasp	about	Hohfeld’s	jural	relations	is	that	are	merely	a	framework	for	analysis;	the	jural	relations	are	sui	generis	creations,	and	Hohfeld	explicitly	declined	to	provide	formal	definitions.44		The	jural	relations	are	a	device	for	fostering	precision	in	legal	analysis.		They	do	not	themselves	purport	to	make	normative	prescriptions	about	what	the	law	should	be.45		The	motivation	for	this	framework	is	as	Hohfeld	puts	it,	“the	ambiguity	and	looseness	of	our	legal	terminology.”46		Hohfeld	offers	the	term	“property”	as	a	“striking	example,”	as	sometimes	it	is	used	to	refer	to	the	physical	object	that	is	the	
																																																								
42 See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[1] (2008) (“a patent 
grants to the patentee and his assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and 
selling the invention”); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“a patent grants only the right to exclude others and confers no right on 
its holder to make, use, or sell”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1806 (2007) (“Although it 
is sometimes overlooked, patent law is explicitly based on exclusion rather than on rights 
to use . . . .”). 
 
43 See Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s right that Y shall not enter on 
the land is Y’s duty not to enter”). 
 
44 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30 (“The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui 
generis; and thus attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether 
useless.”).  
 
45 See Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 189 (“Hohfeld’s work might best be read 
as a contribution about how to think, not what to think.”).   
 
46 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 21.  
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property,	but	sometimes	it	is	“used	to	denote	the	legal	interest	(or	aggregate	of	legal	relations)	appertaining	to	such	physical	object.”47		As	Hohfeld	explains,	confusion	can	arise	because	“[f]requently	there	is	a	rapid	and	fallacious	shift	from	the	onemeaning	to	the	other,”	and	at	times,	the	term	“is	used	in	such	a	‘blended’	sense	as	to	convey	no	definite	meaning	whatever.”48	The	term	“license”	is	a	perfect	example	of	the	type	of	ambiguous	language	that	could	benefit	from	Hohfeldian	analysis.49		“License”	might	refer	to	the	license	
agreement,	the	contract,	between	the	licensor	and	the	licensee.		Or	it	might	refer	to	the	legal	relations	that	arise	from	the	license	agreement,	such	as	the	privilege	to	infringe	a	particular	patent.50		The	distinction	matters	because	while	transfer	of	a	patent	is	generally	held	not	to	affect	the	licensee’s	privilege	to	infringe,	that	does	not	mean	that	the	entire	license	agreement	runs	with	the	patent.			Hohfeld	was	concerned	with	a	similar	issue	regarding	term	“contract,”	in	that	“[o]ne	moment	the	word	may	mean	the	agreement	of	the	parties;	and	then,	with	a	rapid	and	unexpected	shift,	the	writer	or	speaker	may	use	the	term	to	indicate	the																																																									
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. at 21-22. 
 
49 See Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 757 
(1921) (“Here courts tend inveterately to confuse acts and the legal relations which result 
therefrom and the battle begun over words terminates in a result shaped by those 
words.”).  
 
50 Indeed Hohfeld stated that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” is “rapidly shifted 
about by lawyers and courts,” and but did not go much further in this regard because 
“dealing at all adequately with the intricate and confused subject, would, in and of itself, 
require a long article.” Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License 
Cases, 27 YALE L. J. 66, 92 n.49 (1917). 
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contractual	obligation	created	by	law	as	a	result	of	the	agreement.”51		Charles	Clark	also	recognized	this	problem	and	argued	for	distinguishing	between	the	“license”	as	such,	and	the	acts	of	agreement	which	create	the	license.52		Similarly,	Christopher	M.	Newman	explains	that	to	“discuss	clearly	the	relationship	between	license	and	contract,	we	must	also	distinguish	between	acts	that	signify	assent	to	binding	agreements,	documents	in	which	those	agreements	are	memorialized,	and	various	legal	consequences	that	follow	from	them.”53	Hohfeld	developed	the	jural	relations	as	a	terminology	for	the	purely	legal	quantities,	so	as	to	avoid	confusing	them	with	the	physical	or	mental	facts	with	give	rise	to	those	legal	relations.		It	is	helpful	to	break	the	jural	relations	into	two	sets,	here	is	the	first	set	in	terms	of	“correlatives”:	Right	<-->	Duty	No	Right	<-->	Privilege	And	here	is	the	first	set	again	but	in	terms	of	“opposites”:	Right		X		No	Right	Privilege		X		Duty54		 Rights	and	Duties	are	“correlatives,”	in	that	if	A	has	a	Right	against	B,	then	B	owes	a	corresponding	Duty	to	A.55		This	is	not	any	type	of	a	normative	or																																																									
51 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 25; see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 192. 
 
52 Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 760-61 (“The use of 
the one term ‘license’ to describe a privilege accompanied by an immunity from 
revocation and a privilege not so accompanied creates an illusion of certainty and an 
erroneous belief in identity.”).  
 
53 Newman, 98 IOWA L. REV. at 1129. 
 
54 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30.  
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prescriptive	statement,	this	is	just	how	Hohfeld’s	analytical	method	works,	by	definition.		So	if	A	has	a	Right	that	B	stay	off	of	Whiteacre,	then	B	has	a	Duty	to	stay	of	Whiteacre,	because	that	is	precisely	what	it	means	to	say	that	A	has	such	a	Right,	under	Hohfeld’s	framework.56		But	if	B	has	a	Privilege	to	enter	Whiteacre,	then	A	has	a	No	Right	that	B	Stay	off	Whiteacre,	as	No	Rights	are	the	correlatives	of	Privileges	just	as	Rights	are	the	correlatives	of	Duties.57		The	correlatives	are	represented	by	two	way	arrows	above	because	where	one	is	present	(on	one	side	of	a	relation)	the	other	is	present	(on	the	other	side).				 “Rights”	and	“No	Rights”	are	“opposites”	in	that	one	cannot	have	both	a	Right	and	a	No	Right	to	the	same	thing.		The	No	Right	is	the	negation	of	a	Right.		Similarly,	Privileges	and	Duties	are	opposites.		As	Hohfeld	explains,	the	“privilege	of	entering	is	the	negation	of	a	duty	to	stay	off.”58		One	cannot	have	both	a	Privilege	to	enter	and	a	Duty	to	stay	off.		As	such,	the	opposites	are	represented	by	X’s	above	because	where	one	is	present	on	one	side	of	a	relation	the	other	is	absent	on	the	same	side.		The	primary	difference	between	calling	something	a	Right	and	calling	it	a	Privilege,	is	that	a	Right	forms	the	predicate	basis	for	an	affirmative	legal	claim,																																																																																																																																																																						
 
55 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 32 (“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the 
former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay 
off the place”).  
 
56 Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“It is not so much that rights ‘imply’ or ‘give 
rise’ to duties.  Rather, one’s rights are duties in someone else just as one’s duties are 
rights in someone else.  As Karl Llewellyn observed, rights and duties are simply 
different ways of talking about the same legal relation.”).  
 
57 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s privilege of entering himself is 
manifestly Y’s ‘no-right’ that X shall not enter”).  
 
58 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 32.  
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whereas	a	Privilege	is	a	defense	to	a	legal	claim,	or	the	freedom	from	such	a	claim.		As	explained	by	Hohfeld:	“A	right	is	one’s	affirmative	claim	against	another,	and	a	privilege	is	one’s	freedom	from	the	right	or	claim	of	another."59		Once	this	is	understood,	the	seemingly	odd	terminology	of	a	“No	Right”	begins	to	make	sense.		A	violation	of	a	Duty	opens	one	up	to	a	legal	claim	under	the	correlative	Right.		By	contrast,	the	exercise	of	a	Privilege	does	not	subject	one	to	a	legal	claim,	as	the	correlative	is	a	“No	Right.”		But	a	Privilege	does	not	imply	an	affirmative	claim	against	one	who	interferes	with	the	exercise	of	the	Privilege.60			The	second	set	of	jural	relations	functions	similarly	to	the	first	set,	here	is	the	second	set	in	terms	of	correlatives:	Power	<-->	Liability	Disability	<-->	Immunity	Here	is	the	second	set	again	but	in	terms	of	opposites:	Power	X	Disability	Immunity	X	Liability61	A	Power	is	similar	to	a	Right,	a	Liability	is	similar	to	a	Duty,	a	Disability	(or	“No	Power”)	is	similar	to	a	No	Right,	and	an	Immunity	is	similar	to	a	Privilege.62		The																																																									
 
59 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55.  
 
60 Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“This gets us to the crux of the matter with 
regard to the difference between rights and privileges.  The former establishes the 
predicate for a legal remedy, namely a duty in B.”). 
 
61 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30.   
 
62 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55 (“a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity 
that a right does to a privilege”). 
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difference	is	that,	unlike	a	Right	which	represents	the	potential	for	an	affirmative	claim	against	another,	a	“power	is	one’s	affirmative	‘control’	over	a	given	legal	relation	as	against	another.”63		For	example,	if	A	makes	a	contractual	offer	to	B,	B	now	has	the	Power	to	accept	that	offer,	and	A	is	Liable	in	the	sense	that	A	would	be	bound	if	B	chooses	to	accept.64		Upon	expiration	of	the	offer,	B’s	Power	becomes	a	Disability,	and	A’s	Liability	becomes	an	Immunity.			The	first	set	of	jural	relations	tracks	the	patent	license	situation	rather	well.		A	patent	holder	has	the	Right	to	exclude	others	from	practicing	the	claimed	invention;	as	such,	others	have	a	Duty	to	refrain	from	infringing	the	patent.		When	a	patent	holder	grants	a	license,	the	licensee	can	be	said	to	have	been	granted	a	Privilege	to	infringe	the	patent.65		The	patent	owner	licensor	now	has	a	“No	Right”	in	that	she	has	given	up	the	Right	to	exclude	the	licensee.		She	has	given	up	that	stick	in	the	bundle	of	sticks	that	is	the	patent.		The	licensee	is	thereby	freed	from	his	Duty	to	refrain	from	infringing.66		As	the	Federal	Circuit	has	explained:	Even	if	couched	in	terms	of	“licensee	is	given	the	right	to	make,	use,	or	sell	X,”	the	[license]	agreement	cannot	convey	that	absolute	right																																																									
 
63 Id. at 55.  
 
64 Id. at 49. 
 
65 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In its 
simplest form, a license means only leave to do a thing which the licensor would 
otherwise have a right to prevent.  Such a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege 
that protects him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent monopoly.”) 
(quoting Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d. Cir. 
1930)) (emphasis added). 
 
66 See Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“If a patent licensee has a privilege to use the 
licensed patent, this indicates that the licensee has no duty to refrain from using the 
patent.”).    
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because	not	even	the	patentee	of	X	is	given	that	right.		His	right	is	merely	one	to	exclude	others	from	making,	using	or	selling	X.	.	.	.67		 As	such,	the	license	agreement,	in	the	form	of	a	contract,	can	be	said	to	effect	the	following	purely	legal	change:	the	relationship	between	the	licensor	and	the	licensee,	with	respect	to	the	patent,	flips	from	one	of	Right	/	Duty,	to	one	of	No	Right	/	Privilege.		Under	the	bundle	theory,	when	a	patent	is	transferred,	while	the	license	agreement	(the	contract)	will	remain	between	the	original	two	parties,	this	change	in	legal	relation	will	travel	with	the	patent,	remaining	between	the	patentee	and	the	licensee.		The	distinction	between	that	which	travels	with	the	patent	and	that	which	does	not	thus	tracks	Hohfeld’s	distinction	between	the	“purely	legal	relations”	and	the	“physical	and	mental	facts	that	call	such	relations	into	being.”68		If	the	patent	is	a	bundle	of	Rights	to	exclude,	and	the	patentee	has	already	given	up	one	of	the	Rights	in	the	bundle,	the	patentee	may	transfer	only	what	is	left,	under	nemo	dat.		In	place	of	the	Right	to	exclude	the	licensee,	the	transferred	bundle	contains	a	No	Right	to	exclude,	and	the	licensee	thus	maintains	its	Privilege	to	infringe	the	patent.		
D. In	Rem	(Multital)	Versus	In	Personam	(Paucital)			 Another	important	point	to	understand	is	that	in	Hohfeld’s	scheme,	all	rights	are	between	human	beings,	rather	than	things.		As	Hohfeld	explains,	“since	the	purpose	of	the	law	is	to	regulate	the	conduct	of	human	beings,	all	jural	relations	
																																																								
 
67 Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 35 
U.S.C. § 154). 
 
68 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 20.  
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must,	in	order	to	be	clear	and	direct	in	their	meaning,	be	predicated	of	such	human	beings.”69		Similarly,	at	the	dawn	of	the	20th	Century,	Oliver	Wendell	Holmes	stated:	“All	proceedings,	like	all	rights,	are	really	against	persons.		Whether	they	are	proceedings	or	rights	in	rem	depends	on	the	number	of	persons	affected.”70	The	notion	that	all	rights	are	between	people,	not	things,	is	in	tension	with	the	terminology	of	“in	rem,”	which	literally	means	“against	or	about	a	thing.”71		This	bothered	Hohfeld.		Again	in	the	name	of	precision	and	avoidance	of	confusion,	Hohfeld	was	insistent	that	a	“right	in	rem	is	not	a	right	‘against	a	thing.’”72		Hohfeld	was	of	the	view	that	“because	of	the	unfortunate	terminology	involved,	the	expression	‘right	in	rem’	is	all	too	frequently	misconceived,	and	meanings	attributed	to	it	that	could	not	fail	to	blur	and	befog	legal	thought	and	argument.”73		Thus	Hohfeld	proposed	the	alternative	terminology	(which	never	really	caught	on)	of	“multital”	(instead	of	in	rem)	and	“paucital”	(instead	of	in	personam).74	
																																																								
69 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 721 (1917).  This second article is somewhat of a 
continuation of or sequel to Hohfeld’s first (1913) article on the jural relations, which had 
the same title.   
 
70 Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76 (1900).    
 
71 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 782 n.28. 
 
72 Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720.  See also, id. at 733 (“the attempt to conceive of a right 
in rem as a right against a thing should be abandoned as intrinsically unsound, as 
thoroughly discredited according to good usage, and, finally, as all too likely to confuse 
and mislead”).    
 
73 Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720.  
 
74 Id. at 712. 
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According	to	Hohfeld,	the	real	difference	between	a	right	in	rem	and	a	right	in	
personam	is	not	that	the	former	is	against	a	thing	and	the	latter	is	against	a	person.		They	are	both	against	people.		The	difference	is	one	of	quantity;	the	in	rem	right	is	held	against	many	other	people	(it	is	multital),	whereas	the	in	personam	right	is	held	against	one	person,	or	a	few	people	(it	is	paucital).		Or	as	Hohfeld	put	it,	“a	right	in	
personam	is	one	having	few,	if	any,	‘companions,’;	whereas	a	right	in	rem	always	has	many	such	‘companions.’”75		Although	Hohfeld	himself	did	not	use	the	term	“bundle	of	rights,”	once	we	conceive	of	an	in	rem	right	as	a	multitude	of	“companion”	rights,	we	are	well	on	our	way	towards	the	bundle	theory.76	There	are	a	couple	other	general	characteristics	of	in	rem	rights	that	are	worth	mentioning.		One	is	that	in	rem	rights	are	generally	negative	in	character	in	that	they	require	that	persons	abstain	from	doing	something,	(i.e.,	the	duty	not	to	infringe	a	patent).77		This	makes	sense	as	it	would	be	rather	onerous	if	an	in	rem	right	required	its	many	subjects	to	all	affirmatively	do	something.		Another	is	that	the	class	of	dutyholders	subject	to	an	in	rem	right	is	not	only	large,	but	also	indefinite	with	respect	to	identity.78		For	example,	a	patent	owner	would	not	be	able	to	name	every	person	subject	to	the	duty	to	refrain	from	infringement.			
																																																								
 
75 Id. at 723.  
 
76 See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 743 (“the supposed single right in rem correlating with ‘a 
duty’ on ‘all’ persons really involves as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations 
as there are persons subject to a duty”).  
 
77 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 788; A.M. Honore, Rights of Exclusion and 
Immunities Against Divesting, 34 TUL. L. REV. 453, 458-59 (1960).  
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As	with	his	framework	of	jural	relations,	Hohfeld’s	multital	/	paucital	framework	maps	well	onto	the	patent	license	situation.79		A	patent	owner	has	a	multital	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude	against	other	persons.		The	license	agreement	is	a	paucital	contract	that	serves	to	negate	or	eliminate	one	of	those	rights,	that	with	respect	to	the	licensee.80		The	patent	owner	retains	the	bundle	of	rights,	but	there	is	one	less	right	in	the	bundle.		When	the	patent	owner	transfers	the	bundle,	she	transfers	only	what	remains	in	it.		The	bundle	(or	patent)	does	not	revert	to	its	original	size	upon	transfer.81		But	the	license	agreement,	the	in	personam	contract,	nevertheless	remains	between	the	patent	transferor	and	the	licensee.					Because	a	patent	is	not	a	tangible	thing	and	does	not	provide	a	“right	to	use,”	it	is	particularly	well	suited	to	the	bundle	of	rights	conception.		Perhaps	the	strongest	critique	of	the	bundle	of	rights	theory	of	property	is	that	it	fails	to	sufficiently	reflect	the	fact	that	ownership	often	provides	the	right	to	use	and	
																																																																																																																																																																					
78 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783-84; Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 
U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920).   
 
79 See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 719 (“A’s right against B is a multital right, or right in 
rem, for it is simply one of A’s class of similar, though separate, rights, actual and 
potential, against very many persons.  The same points apply as regards . . . A’s right that 
B shall not manufacture a certain article as to which A has a so-called patent.”). 
 
80 J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“Licenses do not affect all holders of the general 
duty to exclude themselves from the property of others; only those party to the license are 
relieved of the duty.”). 
 
81 Cf., Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“[I]f A sells Blackacre to B, this 
does not result in any change in the duties of third parties W, X, Y or Z toward 
Blackacre.  Those duties shift silently from A to B without any requirement that W, X, Y, 
or Z be aware of the transfer, or even the identities of A or B.”). 
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control	a	discrete	physical	thing.82		In	the	case	of	land	for	example,	it	is	sometimes	much	simpler	to	conceive	of	ownership	as	dominion	over	the	tangible	parcel	of	land,	rather	than	as	an	abstract	bundle	of	legal	relations	against	the	world.		But	this	critique	has	little	force	as	applied	to	patents.		The	counterpart	of	the	right	to	use	land	might	be	the	patent	right	to	a	particular	market	position	–	a	monopoly	on	the	patented	invention	–	but	the	monopoly	is	intangible	and	is	provided	by	virtue	of	the	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude	others	from	infringing.83	
Part	II	–	Patent	Licenses	On	Transfer			 The	bundle	of	rights	is	often	discussed	in	the	context	of	whether	an	exclusive	patent	licensee	has	standing	to	sue.		The	Federal	Circuit	has	explained	that	to	“have	co-plaintiff	standing	in	an	infringement	suit,	a	licensee	must	hold	some	of	the	proprietary	sticks	from	the	bundle	of	patent	rights.”84		These	“proprietary	rights	granted	by	the	patent	are	the	rights	to	exclude	others	from	making,	using	or	selling	
																																																								
82 See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 743 (“The right to property is a right of exclusion 
which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.”); Merrill & Smith, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“In personam rights attach directly to specific persons, whereas 
in rem rights attach to persons only because of their relationship to a particular ‘thing.’”); 
id. at 783 (“in rem rights . . . attach to persons through their relationship to particular 
things”). 
 
83 See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“one is inexorably led into a realm of 
interminable abstract confusion if one regards the ownership of a patent as really the 
ownership of an idea, rather than a monopoly on action whose scope is defined by an 
extremely important expression of what actions are monopolized, i.e., the patent 
specification and claims”). 
 
84 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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the	invention	in	the	United	States.”85		While	a	non-exclusive,	or	“bare”	license	would	not	transfer	any	rights	to	exclude	and	thus	would	not	transfer	standing,	an	exclusive	licensee	owns	some	of	the	proprietary	sticks	and	may	have	standing.86		As	explained	by	the	en	banc	Federal	Circuit:	If	the	party	has	not	received	an	express	or	implied	promise	of	exclusivity	under	the	patent,	i.e.,	the	right	to	exclude	others	from	making,	using,	or	selling	the	patented	invention,	the	party	has	a	“bare	license,”	and	has	received	only	the	patentee’s	promise	that	the	party	will	not	be	sued	for	infringement.87			 Thus	a	patent	can	be	thought	of	as	a	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude,	for	it	is	the	right	to	exclude	that	is	“at	the	very	heart	of	patent	law.”88		Accordingly,	royalty	rights	arising	from	a	license	agreement	have	been	held	not	to	confer	standing,	as	they	are	“merely	a	means	of	compensation	under	the	agreement,”	rather	than	a	part	of	the	patent	right	itself.89		The	Eastern	District	of	Texas	has	stated:	“A	patentee’s	
																																																								
85 Id. 
 
86 Id. at 1032 (“a licensee with proprietary rights in the patent is generally called an 
‘exclusive’ licensee”).  See also, Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not 
an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in 
Copyright, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. 59, 79 (2013) (“A bare license, however, is nothing 
more than a privilege.”). 
 
87 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  See 
also, Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 90 (explaining that an exclusive license, “is still 
a form of license, however, because the licensor retains a residuum of control over the 
use rights, consisting of the sole power to permit their transfer from one party to 
another.”). 
 
88 Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. 
Md. 1996). 
 
89 Chan v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16390, *19 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 
23, 2003).   
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right	to	royalty	payments	or	infringement	damages	does	not	limit	or	detract	from	the	assignment	of	a	patent	or	substantial	rights	thereunder.”90		 Having	conceptualized	the	patent	as	a	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude,	this	article	now	looks	at	the	effect	of	patent	transfer	on	various	aspects	of	patent	licenses.	
A. Arbitration	Clauses		 The	coexistence	of	the	encumbrance	theory	alongside	elements	of	the	bundle	theory	is	well	demonstrated	in	the	following	paragraph	from	the	Federal	Circuit’s	decision	in	Datatreasury	Corp.	v.	Wells	Fargo	&	Co.:	Appellants	rely	on	cases	standing	for	the	general	proposition	that	because	the	owner	of	a	patent	cannot	transfer	an	interest	greater	than	that	which	it	possesses,	an	assignee	takes	a	patent	subject	to	the	legal	encumbrances	thereon.	.	.	.		However,	the	legal	encumbrances	deemed	to	“run	with	the	patent”	in	these	cases	involved	the	right	to	use	the	patented	product,	not	a	duty	to	arbitrate.		The	cases	do	not	support	a	conclusion	that	procedural	terms	of	a	licensing	agreement	unrelated	to	the	actual	use	of	the	patent	(e.g.	an	arbitration	clause)	are	binding	on	a	subsequent	owner	of	the	patent.91		The	beginning	of	this	paragraph	is	in	some	accord	with	the	bundle	theory	in	invoking	nemo	dat,	the	principle	that	the	owner	of	a	patent	cannot	transfer	an	interest	greater	than	that	which	it	possesses.		However,	the	paragraph	quickly	transitions	to	the	encumbrance	theory	and	the	notion	that	only	encumbrances	related	to	the	“actual	use	of	the	patent”	run	with	the	patent.	
																																																								
90 Dexas Int’l, Ltd. v. Tung Yung Int’l (USA) Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34766, *28 
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia 
S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 
91 Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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In	Datatreasury,	the	agreement	at	issue	was	between	Wells	Fargo	Services	Corp.	(“WFSC”)	and	WMR	e-Pin	LLC	(“WMR”).		The	agreement,	inter	alia,	provided	a	license	to	U.S.	Patent	No.	5,265,007	(“the	007	Patent”)	as	well	as	“all	applications	and	patent	disclosures	related	thereto,”	and	also	included	an	arbitration	clause	which	provided:	“Any	dispute	or	disagreement	arising	between	WMR	and	Wells	Fargo	concerning	the	applicability	or	interpretation	of	this	License	Agreement	shall	be	resolved	in	accordance	with	the	dispute	resolution	procedures	.	.	.	.”92		After	entering	into	the	agreement	with	WFSC,	WMR	assigned	the	007	Patent	to	Datatreasury,	along	with	three	other	patents.		Datatreasury	then	filed	a	complaint	in	the	Eastern	District	of	Texas	accusing	Wells	Fargo	of	infringing	the	three	other	patents.		There	was	a	dispute	as	to	whether	the	three	patents	in	suit	were	“related”	to	the	007	Patent	within	the	meaning	of	the	WFSC	/	WMR	agreement.93		Wells	Fargo	argued	that	this	dispute	should	be	submitted	to	arbitration	in	accordance	with	the	agreement.		But	the	court	held	that	Datatreasury	was	not	bound	by	the	arbitration	clause	because	it	was	not	a	signatory	of	the	contract	and	did	not	participate	in	“negotiating	any	of	its	terms,”	and	that	the	arbitration	clause	did	not	run	with	the	007	Patent	as	it	was	“unrelated	to	the	actual	use	of	the	patent.”94			Although	this	result	seems	correct,	the	reasoning	is	suspect.		One	could	question	whether	the	arbitration	clause	is	really	unrelated	to	the	use	of	the	patent.		If	a	patent	is	a	right	to	exclude	that	is	enforced	through	litigation,	then	one	of	the																																																									
92 Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1370-71. 
 
93 See id. at  1372 n.2. 
 
94 Id. at 1372-73. 
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primary	uses	of	a	patent	might	be	to	bring	a	suit	for	infringement.		A	clause	specifying	the	forum	in	which	such	a	suit	would	take	place	could	be	said	to	relate	to	the	use	of	the	patent.			The	bundle	theory	provides	more	clarity	in	explaining	the	result	of	
Datatreasury.		The	arbitration	clause	provides	the	Power	to	move	an	infringement	suit	to	arbitration.		If	both	parties	hold	this	Power,	then	both	parties	are	subject	to	the	correlative	Liability	of	having	the	case	moved	to	arbitration.		This	Power	arose	from	the	WFSC	/	WMR	agreement,	which	was	an	in	personam	contract	between	those	two	parties,	and	that	contract	remained	between	those	two	parties	when	the	007	Patent	was	transferred.		The	Power	to	move	the	case	to	arbitration	was	not	granted	by	the	USPTO	and	was	never	part	of	the	patent	bundle,	so	the	contract	did	not	operate	to	add	that	Power	to	the	bundle.		Nor	was	the	correlative	Liability	added	to	the	patent	bundle.		The	arbitration	clause	remains	a	feature	of	the	license	
agreement,	the	contract,	and	thus	remains	between	the	two	contracting	parties.					The	theory	that	a	license	is	an	encumbrance	that	“runs	with”	a	patent	has	apparent	roots	in	the	law	of	covenants	that	run	with	land.		Under	the	common	law	deriving	from	Spencer’s	Case,95	for	a	covenant	to	run	with	land,	one	requirement	has	been	that	the	covenant	“touch	or	concern”	the	land.96		This	is	similar	to	the	Federal	Circuit’s	ruling	that	only	encumbrances	that	are	not	“unrelated	to	the	actual	use	of																																																									
 
95 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B. 1583). 
 
96 See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
THE LAND” 96 (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207 (“Spencer’s Case 
established that the burden of a covenant does not run to an assignee unless it ‘touches 
and concerns’ the leased property and is not merely ‘collateral.’”). 
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the	patent”	will	“run	with	the	patent.”97		It	is	also	in	some	accord	with	the	common	law’s	refusal	to	allow	easements	“in	gross”	–	unrelated	to	a	particular	parcel	of	land	–	to	run	with	the	land.98			As	demonstrated	by	the	arbitration	clause	at	issue	in	Datatreasury,	one	problem	with	the	encumbrance	formulation	is	that	it	is	rather	indeterminate.		This	has	been	true	even	with	respect	to	the	common	law	“touches	and	concerns”	rule	for	land.99		But	the	problem	is	even	worse	for	patents,	given	that	patent	rights	are	intangible	so	there	is	no	physical	thing	or	land	to	“touch.”100		What	is	exactly	is	“use	of	the	patent,”	and	how	related	is	related	enough?		This	indeterminacy	is	exacerbated	(or	demonstrated)	by	the	fact	that	in	addition	to	“use	of	the	patent,”	the	rule	has	also	been	alternatively	formulated	in	terms	of	“use	of	the	patented	product,”	and	“use	of	the	invention.”101		
																																																								
97 Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1372-73. 
 
98 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L. J. 885, 894 (2008) 
(“The English courts . . . refused to enforce easements ‘in gross,’ which benefit a person 
or entity without regard to land ownership.”); Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 86 
(“One line of doctrine held that easements were permissible only if made appurtenant to 
an adjacent tenement.”); Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 
1954) (“If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an ‘easement 
in gross’ . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tenements, one dominant, the 
other servient.”). 
 
99 CLARK, REAL COVENANTS, supra, at 96 (“It has been found impossible to state any 
absolute tests to determine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not.”).  
 
100 Cf. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 739 (2007) 
(“extrapolating from real property law to intellectual property law overlooks important 
distinctions between the underlying resources at issue”).  
 
101 Compare Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33 (“licensing terms not tied to 
the right to use a patented invention do not encumber”), with Datatreasury, 522 F.2d 
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B. Royalty	Rights								 It	is	not	necessary	or	practical	for	purposes	of	this	article	to	go	into	too	much	detail	regarding	the	substantial	intricacies	of	the	common	law	on	covenants	running	with	land.		But	one	important	point	is	that	when	a	landowner	leases	land,	and	then	transfers	the	leased	land,	the	benefit	of	rent	is	said	to	run	with	the	land	to	the	new	landowner.102		The	patent	law	analogue	of	the	rent	a	landowner	receives	is	the	royalties	that	a	patent	owner	might	receive	under	a	license	agreement.		Applying	the	encumbrance	theory,	one	would	think	that	just	as	the	rent	paid	by	a	tenant	runs	with	the	land,	royalty	rights	paid	by	the	licensee	should	run	with	the	patent,	for	it	would	be	hard	to	argue	that	such	royalty	rights	do	not	relate	to	the	use	of	the	patent.	But	in	this	regard,	the	caselaw	has	reached	the	opposite	conclusion,	demonstrating	another	inadequacy	of	the	encumbrance	theory.		In	Jones	v.	Cooper,	the	Texas	Court	of	Appeals	stated	that	“‘royalties,’	.	.	.	would	not	‘run	with’	title	to	the	patents	and	be	binding	upon	subsequent	assignees,”	invoking	the	principle	that	“[s]ince	a	patent	is	[by	statute]	to	be	treated	as	personal	property,	there	can	be	no	covenants	that	‘run	with’	the	patent.”103		Similarly,	in	In	re	Particle	Drilling	Techs.,	the	court	found	that	a	“royalty	interest	in	a	patent	cannot	be	considered	a	covenant																																																																																																																																																																						
1368, 1372-73 (“[T]he legal encumbrances deemed to ‘run with the patent’ in these cases 
involved the right to use the patented product, not a duty to arbitrate.  The cases do not 
support a conclusion that procedural terms of a licensing agreement unrelated to the 
actual use of the patent (e.g. an arbitration clause) are binding on subsequent owners of 
the patent.”) (emphases added).   
 
102 Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222.  
 
103 See Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Tex. App. 14th 1996); 35 
U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal property”); Pressure Sys. Int’l 
v. Airgo IP, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90166, *15 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Agreements 
about patent rights do not run with the patents; they are also personal”). 
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that	runs	with	the	land,”	again	invoking	the	principle	that	patents	are	personal	property	and	“[r]eal	property	concepts	(such	as	covenants	running	with	the	land)	do	not	apply	to	personal	property.”104	The	notion	that	royalty	rights	should	not	automatically	run	with	a	patent	seems	reasonable,	in	part	because	often	royalty	rights	will	not	correspond	directly	to	the	use	of	a	single	patent	in	the	way	that	rent	corresponds	to	the	use	of	single	tract	of	land.		The	license	agreement	may	cover	an	entire	portfolio	of	patents	relating	to	the	same	products	or	even	different	types	of	products.		If	only	one	or	some	of	these	patents	are	transferred,	it	might	be	difficult	to	apportion	how	much	of	the	royalty	rights	should	transfer.		Of	course,	when	transferring	the	patent,	the	transferor	and	transferee	could	contract	around	the	default	rule	and	agree	that	some	royalties	will	pass	to	the	transferee	along	with	the	patent.		But	keeping	the	royalties	with	the	transferor	seems	to	provide	the	clearest	and	most	coherent	default	rule,	thereby	lowering	transaction	costs.105	Furthermore,	some	of	the	consideration	for	a	license	agreement	may	be	in	the	form	of	a	cross-license	to	the	licensee’s	patents.		Would	the	cross	license	also	run	with	the	patent	in	the	way	an	easement	to	use	an	adjoining	tract	of	land	runs	with	a	parcel	of	land?		This	would	seem	problematic.		Returning	to	the	hypothetical																																																									
 
104 In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009).  
 
105 See COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS at 89; Part I(B), supra; see also, Jeremy 
Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D. 141, 155 (2014) (“[E]stablish rules that 
are clear and predictable, so that the costs of bargaining post-intervention are lower.  
Bargaining can be difficult enough without having to spend time and money determining 
where everyone stands.”). 
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illustration	from	Part	I,	the	patent	transferor	(A)	and	the	transferee	(C)	may	not	be	similarly	situated	(cross)	licensees	from	the	perspective	of	B.		That	is,	C	may	be	a	much	larger	company	and	as	such	B	may	have	been	able	to	gain	much	more	from	granting	a	license	to	C	as	compared	with	A.		And	with	respect	to	cross-licenses	as	well,	there	is	again	the	recurrent	problem	of	apportionment	if	A	transfers	only	some	of	the	relevant	patents	to	C.		These	issues	stem	in	part	from	the	fact	that	patents	are	rights	to	intangible	property	and	so	cannot	adjoin	another	patent	right	in	the	way	that	one	tract	of	land	can	clearly	adjoin	another.		These	types	of	difficulties	hinder	the	smooth	application	to	patents	of	the	encumbrance	theory	apparently	derived	from	real	property	law.	How	to	explain	then	the	holdings	that	royalties	do	not	run	with	patents?		Under	the	encumbrance	theory,	the	principle	invoked	by	the	courts	–	that	patents	are	personal	property	with	which	covenants	cannot	run	–	proves	too	much.		This	principle	would	also	seem	to	entirely	prevent	license	rights	from	running	with	patents,	but	it	cannot	be	that	the	mere	transfer	of	a	patent	wipes	the	patent	clean	of	all	licenses.		And	so	the	courts	have	held;	it	“is	a	longstanding	principle	that	an	assignee	of	a	patent	takes	the	patent	subject	to	prior	licenses.”106		Thus	courts	seem	to	invoke	the	notion	that	covenants	cannot	run	with	personal	property	only	selectively	and	inconsistently,	with	no	acknowledgement	of	the	inconsistency	and	no	real	guidance	on	when	the	principle	should	be	invoked.	Unlike	the	encumbrance	theory,	the	bundle	theory	provides	a	reconciliation	of	the	apparent	realities	that	a	covenant	not	to	sue	run	with	the	patent	but	royalty																																																									
106 Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (citing Keystone Type Foundry v. 
Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1921)). 
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rights	do	not.		The	royalty	right	was	never	a	part	of	the	bundle	of	rights	granted	by	the	USPTO.		The	patent	is	a	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude.107		A	patentee	that	grants	a	license	essentially	sells	one	of	the	sticks	in	the	bundle,	the	one	that	provides	the	right	to	exclude	the	licensee.		That	stick	is	no	longer	in	the	bundle.		Perhaps	royalty	rights	are	received	in	exchange,	but	that	does	not	make	the	royalty	rights	part	of	the	patent	bundle.		When	the	patent	is	transferred,	what	is	transferred	is	the	group	of	sticks	that	remain	in	the	bundle.		Thus	the	transferee	of	the	patent	takes	the	patent	“diminished	by	the	licensee’s	right	to	use	the	patented	process	within	the	scope	of	the	license,”108	even	though	the	transferee	does	not	become	a	party	to	the	license	
agreement.		The	bundle	theory	thus	accords	with	the	principle	that	“the	owner	of	a	patent	cannot	transfer	an	interest	greater	than	that	which	it	possesses.”109	The	discussion	of	royalty	rights	highlights	an	important	feature	of	the	bundle	approach.		Under	the	bundle	approach,	only	the	burdens	of	a	license	agreement	may	run	with	the	patent,	the	benefits	do	not	run	as	a	default	matter,	though	a	patent	transferor	could	agree	to	transfer	them	in	the	sale.		The	burdens	run	to	the	extent	that	they	are	conceived	of	as	a	lessening	of	the	bundle	of	patent	rights.		The	benefits	cannot	run,	because	a	license	agreement	cannot	add	to	the	bundle	of	patent	rights,	cannot	make	the	patent	more	than	the	bundle	of	rights	granted	by	the	USPTO.		
																																																								
 
107 See n.42, supra. 
 
108 L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 118 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1941).  
 
109 Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1372; see also, Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93820, *15 (“Patent owners cannot transfer an interest greater than what they possess.”).   
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C. Confidentiality	Provisions				Contractual	obligations	to	keep	confidential	the	terms	of	a	patent	license	agreement	have	also	been	held	not	to	bind	subsequent	owners	of	the	licensed	patent.		In	Paice	v.	Hyundai,	in	the	District	of	Maryland,	the	plaintiff,	Paice,	LLC,	had	previously	sued	Toyota	for	infringement	of	certain	patents,	which	litigation	had	settled.		Subsequently,	Abell,	a	non-profit	organization,	became	a	co-owner	of	the	patents,	which	related	to	hybrid	electric	technology	and	fuel	efficiency.110		Paice	and	Abell	then	sued	Hyundai	on	the	same	patents,	and	sought	to	disclose	the	Paice-Toyota	settlement	agreement	in	the	Hyundai	litigation	as	evidence	of	reasonable	royalties	for	purposes	of	damages.		Toyota	intervened	to	prevent	the	disclosure	of	the	settlement	agreement,	invoking	a	confidentiality	provision	in	the	agreement,	which	stated	that	the	“terms	of	this	Agreement	are	confidential	and	shall	not	be	disclosed	unless	required	by	law.”111		The	court	granted	Toyota’s	motion	to	prevent	disclosure	of	the	settlement	agreement	with	respect	to	Paice,	but	not	with	respect	to	co-plaintiff	Abell,	because	Abell	was	not	a	party	to	the	settlement	agreement.112			Applying	Datatreasury,	the	Paice	court	held	that	the	confidentiality	provision	did	not	run	with	the	patents,	because	it	was	“clearly	a	procedural	term	unrelated	to	the	right	to	use	Paice’s	(and	now	Abell’s)	patents.”113		Toyota	argued	that	“use”																																																									
110 Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15425, *2-3 (D. Md. Oct. 
29, 2014) 
 
111 Id. at *9. 
 
112 Id. at *11. 
 
113 Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *33 (magistrate memorandum opinion). 
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within	the	meaning	of	Datatreasury	“contemplates	use	of	the	license	agreement	in	a	patent	infringement	trial,”	but	the	court	disagreed.114		The	court	recognized	the	“potential	problem”	of	“a	patent	owner,	in	bad	faith,	transferring	interest	in	the	patent	for	the	sole	purpose	of	circumventing	a	confidentiality	provision,”	but	noted	that	this	problem	did	not	apply	in	the	present	case	and	that	“a	future	court	may	create	an	exception”	for	such	a	situation.115	Applying	the	bundle	theory,	the	confidentiality	provision	is	an	in	personam	agreement	between	the	two	signatories	to	the	contract.		It	cannot	prevent	third	parties	from	attempting	to	compel	disclosure	of	the	agreement.		There	is	no	sense	in	which	confidentiality	obligations	can	be	though	of	as	changing	the	bundle	of	patent	rights.		Thus	the	holding	of	Paice	that	confidentiality	provisions	are	generally	not	binding	on	patent	transferees	can	be	explained	under	either	theory.			
D. Termination		The	power	to	terminate	the	license	presents	some	more	difficult	questions.		At	common	law,	if	a	lease	gives	a	landowner	the	right	to	terminate	the	lease,	that	benefit	would	generally	run	with	the	land.116		This	would	seem	to	be	the	case	under	the	encumbrance	theory	as	well,	as	it	seems	that	the	right	to	terminate	the	license	(and	thus	use	the	patent	unencumbered	by	the	license)	relates	to	the	“actual	use”	of	
																																																								
114 Id. 
 
115 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154254, at *17-18. 
 
116 Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 233 (“it has been held that the benefit of a covenant 
allowing the landowner to terminate the lease under certain described conditions runs to 
the landlord’s successor in interest”). 
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the	patent.		But	there	are	good	reasons	why	a	termination	right	should	not	run.		Presumably,	the	thing	stopping	the	patent	owner	from	exercising	the	right	to	terminate	is	the	benefit	(e.g.,	royalty	rights	or	cross-license	rights)	that	the	patent	owner	is	receiving	under	the	license	agreement,	which	would	cease	upon	termination.		If	these	benefits	do	not	run	with	the	patent,	then	there	would	be	nothing	stopping	a	subsequent	patent	owner	from	exercising	the	right	to	terminate.		Thus	if	termination	power	runs	with	the	patent,	this	could	effectively	eviscerate	the	general	rule	that	patent	assignees	must	respect	pre-existing	licenses.		Note	that	this	problem	does	not	exist	in	the	land	situation	because	the	tenant	would	be	paying	rent	to	the	new	owner	of	the	land.117			On	the	other	hand,	if	the	power	to	terminate	the	license	does	not	run,	then	transfer	of	the	patent	would	seem	to	convert	a	terminable	license	to	an	interminable	one.		This	might	initially	seem	problematic,	but	it	makes	sense	if	the	Power	to	terminate	is	viewed	as	a	Power	to	terminate	the	entire	license	agreement,	rather	than	only	the	license	to	one	patent.		The	licensee	thus	has	a	Liability	to	termination	of	the	entire	contract.		This	explanation	comports	with	the	bundle	theory;	the	Power	to	terminate	is	a	feature	of	the	contract,	which	remains	between	the	original	two	parties,	it	does	not	affect	the	bundle	of	patent	rights.		The	Power	to	terminate	arises	from	the	license	agreement,	as	the	Power	was	not	part	of	the	bundle	granted	by	the	USPTO.		Under	the	bundle	theory,	the	license	agreement	cannot	add	the	termination	power	to	the	patent	bundle.		Thus	termination	is	another	instance	where	the	bundle	theory	is	more	coherent	than	the	encumbrance	theory.																																																									
117 Id. at 222. 
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E. LOT	Revisited		This	article	now	returns	to	the	LOT	agreement	discussed	in	the	introduction.		The	LOT	is	an	agreement	entered	into	by	a	group	of	companies	which	is	supposed	to	prevent	any	of	them	from	transferring	their	patents	to	a	patent	troll,	or	Patent	Assertion	Entity,	by	granting	a	license	which	becomes	effective	only	upon	transfer	of	the	patent	to	a	troll.			Section	1.1	of	the	LOT	agreement	–	License	Grant	and	Release	–	provides	to	every	Licensee	a	“fully	vested	and	irrevocable”	“license	to	make,	have	made	.	.	.	at	any	time	on	or	after	any	Transfer	of	the	respective	Subject	Patent	to	an	Assertion	Entity.”118		Section	1.2	states:	“With	respect	to	each	Subject	Patent	of	the	Licensor,	the	License	constitutes	a	present,	fully	vested	and	irrevocable	(except	as	provided	in	Section	2	below)	waiver	of	the	right	under	the	respective	Subject	Patent	for	any	Assertion	Entity	to	make	any	Patent	Assertion	of	the	respective	Subject	Patent	against	any	Licensee	.	.	.	.”119		Thus	section	1.2	is	structured	as	a	“present”	waiver.		But	what	exactly	is	being	presently	waived?		It	is	the	potential	future	right	of	an	“Assertion	Entity”	–	not	a	party	to	the	agreement	-	to	enforce	the	patent.			A	paper	by	one	of	the	LOT	founders	implies	that	the	LOT	is	an	encumbrance	that	runs	with	the	patent,	though	the	paper	contains	no	analysis	on	this	point.120		
																																																								
 
118 LOT Agreement v2-0-11_24_15, at § 1.1, available at http://lotnet.com/download-lot-
agreement (accessed Dec. 2016). 
 
119 Id. at § 1.2. 
 
120 C. Eric Schulman, How Scalable Private-Ordering Solutions Improve IP Law: 
Lessons Learned from my Founding of the License On Transfer (LOT) Network, available 
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But	it	cannot	be	that	the	entire	LOT	agreement	is	an	encumbrance,	as	it	contains	many	provisions	not	directly	related	to	the	actual	use	of	the	patent,	including	provisions	relating	to	withdrawl,	bankruptcy,	third	party	beneficiaries,	costs,	governing	law,	and	other	issues.121			The	LOT	agreement	also	attempts	to	declare	that:	All	Licenses	granted	in	this	Agreement	are	intended	to	and	shall	run	with	the	Subject	Patents	to	which	they	pertain	for	the	full	duration	of	such	Subject	Patents	and	be	binding	on	subsequent	owners	and	licensees.		Any	transfer	or	grant	of	rights	in	or	to	a	Licensor’s	Subject	Patent(s),	whether	by	such	Licensor	or	any	subsequent	transferee,	shall	be	subject	to	the	Licenses	and	continuing	obligations	of	this	Agreement	with	respect	to	such	Subject	Patent(s).122			 But	the	enforceability	of	this	provision	is	questionable,	at	least	in	certain	situations.		If	a	PAE	(“Patent	Assertion	Entity”)	were	to	purchase	one	of	the	patents	in	question,	the	PAE	would	not	be	a	party	to	the	LOT	agreement.		One	cannot	be	bound	by	a	contract	to	which	one	is	not	a	party.123		Significant	information	costs	would	be	imposed	if	a	patent	buyer	could	be	bound	(potentially	without	notice)	by	the	complex	provisions	of	any	license	agreement	entered	into	by	any	prior	owner.124																																																																																																																																																																							
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827904 (accessed Dec. 2016) (“This structure protects LOT 
members from being attacked when a PAE acquires a LOT-encumbered patent.”). 
 
121 See LOT Agreement v2-0-11_24_15, at § 2.3, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, available at 
http://lotnet.com/download-lot-agreement (accessed Dec. 2016). 
 
122 LOT Agreement at § 1.5. 
 
123 See n.9, supra. 
 
124 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 793 (“The unique advantage of in rem rights 
– the strategy of exclusion – is that they conserve on information costs relative to in 
personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is 
large, and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”). 
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	 Even	under	the	encumbrance	theory,	problematic	situations	could	arise.		The	license	of	Section	1.1	becomes	active	upon	“Transfer”	to	an	“Assertion	Entity,”	as	noted	above.		Section	6.18	of	the	agreement	defines	Transfer	to	Assertion	Entity	as:	“(i)	the	assignment,	sale,	exclusive	license,	or	transfer,	in	whole	or	in	part,	of	such	Patent	to	an	Assertion	Entity,	whether	by	Licensor	or	any	
subsequent	transferee	or	exclusive	licensee	of	the	Subject	Patent,	or	(ii)	acquisition	of	ownership	or	control	of	the	Subject	Patent	by	an	Assertion	Entity	(including	any	circumstance	in	which	Licensor	or	any	subsequent	transferee	owning	or	controlling	the	Subject	Patent	is	or	becomes	an	Assertion	Entity	.	.	.),	with	the	earliest	date	any	Entity	owning	or	controlling	such	Patent	is	or	becomes	an	Assertion	Entity	or	Controlled	by	an	Assertion	Entity	being	deemed	to	be	the	effective	date	of	such	Transfer.”125		 Thus	even	if	a	patent	is	initially	transferred	to	a	regular	operating	company	that	is	not	a	party	to	the	LOT,	if	that	company	then	transfers	the	patent	to	an	Assertion	Entity	(or	becomes	an	Assertion	Entity),	the	LOT	license	is	supposedly	activated.		Assertion	Entity	is	defined	in	section	6.2	as	“an	Entity	and	each	one	of	its	Affiliates	if	such	Entity	and	all	of	its	Affiliates	collectively	derived	from	Patent	Assertion	more	than	half	of	their	total	consolidated	gross	revenue	measured	over	the	full	twelve	(12)	months	preceding	a	particular	date	.	.	.	.”126		As	such,	in	order	for	the	LOT	to	be	fully	enforceable,	the	definitions	of	Transfer	and	of	Assertion	Entity	must	be	part	of	the	“encumbrance”	that	“runs	with	the	patent.”		But	it	is	certainly	questionable	whether	these	complex	definitions	relate	to	the	“actual	use	of	the	patent”	(or	use	of	the	patented	product)	any	more	than	the	arbitration	clause	that	
																																																								
125 LOT Agreement § 6.18 (emphasis added). 
 
126 LOT Agreement § 6.2. 
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the	Federal	Circuit	held	not	to	run	with	the	patent	in	Datatreasury,	or	the	royalty	rights	and	confidentiality	provisions	that	have	also	been	held	not	to	run.127	Application	of	the	bundle	theory	to	the	LOT	further	highlights	the	problem.		Something	like	the	LOT	could	potentially	be	conceptualized	under	the	bundle	theory	as	a	license	granted	immediately	prior	to	transfer.		Using	the	bundle	theory,	the	LOT	member	could	give	up	the	sticks	corresponding	to	the	rights	to	exclude	the	other	LOT	members	immediately	prior	to	transferring	the	patent	to	a	PAE,	and	the	PAE	would	thus	receive	a	diminished	bundle	of	sticks	without	the	rights	to	exclude	the	LOT	members.		This	would	be	in	some	accord	with	the	LOT’s	name;	a	license	granted	“on”	(or	immediately	prior	to)	the	transfer	of	a	patent	from	a	LOT	member.			But	the	problem	for	the	LOT	is	that	the	agreement	is	not	actually	structured	this	way;	it	purports	to	also	apply	even	where	the	patent	is	not	transferred	directly	from	a	LOT	member	to	a	PAE.		For	example	where	the	patent	is	first	transferred	to	a	non-LOT	operating	company,	which	then	transfers	it	to	a	PAE,	the	full	bundle	must	be	transferred	to	the	non-LOT	operating	company,	and	then	the	bundle	must	somehow	be	diminished	upon	transfer	from	the	non-LOT	operating	company	to	the	PAE,	even	if	neither	is	a	party	to	the	LOT.128		Similarly,	if	the	patent	is	transferred	to	a	non-LOT	operating	company,	which	then	becomes	a	PAE,	the	bundle	must	somehow	be	diminished	at	the	moment	the	company	turns	into	a	PAE	(as	defined	by	the	LOT)	even	though	the	company	is	not	a	party	to	the	LOT.	
																																																								
127 See Part II(A), supra (discussing Datatreasury, 522 F.3d 1372); Part II(B)-(C), supra. 
 
128 See LOT Agreement § 6.18, 6.2.  
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Furthermore,	section	1.2	purports	to	presently	waive	the	“right	under	the	respective	Subject	Patent	for	any	Assertion	Entity	to	make	any	Patent	Assertion	of	the	respective	Subject	Patent	against	any	Licensee.	.	.	.”129		But	can	a	patent	owner	waive	the	right	of	someone	else	to	assert	the	patent?		This	would	conceptually	require	multiplying	the	bundle	of	patent	rights	to	include	the	inchoate	rights	of	anyone	who	might	potentially	later	own	the	patent,	which	would	seem	to	be	a	convoluted	and	problematic	notion	of	property.		A	patent	is	more	coherently	thought	of	as	a	bundle	of	rights	to	exclude,	owned	by	whoever	owns	the	patent.					The	enforceability	of	the	LOT	is	thus	questionable,	and	could	impose	significant	information	costs	on	downstream	acquirers	of	the	patent,	particularly	where	the	patent	is	not	transferred	directly	from	a	LOT	member	to	a	PAE.		One	of	the	LOT	founders	apparently	likens	the	LOT	to	an	Open	Source	copyright	license.130		In	the	case	of	an	Open	Source	license,	users	are	granted	a	license	free	of	charge	provided	they	agree	to	the	terms	of	the	license.131		But	this	does	not	involve	a	transfer	of	the	copyright	or	terms	of	the	license	agreement	running	with	such	a	transfer.		The	LOT	presents	the	different	question	of	attempting	to	bind	future	patent	acquirers	to	the	complex	terms	of	a	contract	to	which	they	have	not	agreed.																																																									
129 LOT Agreement § 1.2. 
 
130 Schulman, supra at *1 (“Open Source is one example of a POS in the copyright 
context.  This paper uses the License On Transfer (LOT) Network (the largest networked 
patent cross license by number of patents) as a case study of a POS.”). 
 
131 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“By requiring that 
users copy and restate the license and attribution information, a copyright holder can 
ensure that recipients of the redistributed computer code know the identity of the owner 
as well as the scope of the license granted by the original owner.”). 
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To	be	sure,	the	terms	of	the	original	license	agreement	are	generally	important	to	the	new	patent	owner	to	the	extent	that	they	altered	the	rights	in	the	patent	bundle.		For	example,	a	patentee,	through	a	license	agreement,	might	agree	not	only	to	refrain	from	suing	the	licensee,	but	also	to	refrain	from	suing	the	licensee’s	customers.132		In	such	a	case,	the	bundle	is	diminished	by	not	only	the	stick	corresponding	to	right	to	exclude	the	licensee,	but	also	by	the	sticks	corresponding	to	the	rights	to	exclude	the	licensee’s	customers.		Thus	under	the	bundle	metaphor,	the	patent	transferee	would	not	have	a	right	to	exclude	the	licensee’s	customers,	as	the	patent	transferor	gave	up	those	rights	and	so	could	not	have	transferred	them.		But	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	subsequent	patent	owner	still	is	not	a	party	to	the	contracts	agreed	to	by	prior	owners	of	the	patent.		It	is	one	thing	to	diminish	the	patent	bundle	by	giving	up	the	rights	to	exclude	certain	other	entities.		It	is	another	thing	for	a	patent	owner	to	purport	to	give	up	the	rights	of	others	who	might	potentially	own	the	patent	in	the	future,	while	keeping	those	rights	for	itself	in	the	present.	
Part	III	–	Broader	Implications		 The	bundle	theory	and	the	encumbrance	theory	are	different	ways	of	thinking	about	the	effect	of	patent	transfer	on	aspects	of	license	agreements.		Sometimes	these	different	theories	lead	to	significantly	different	results.		Having	determined	that	the	bundle	theory	more	elegantly	and	coherently	explains	the																																																									
132 See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Wi-LAN USA, Inc., No. 14-21854-CV-DMM, D.I. 165, *3 
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 2015) (“Ericsson maintains that pursuant to the Siemens License, 
LME and Siemens provided each other, their related companies, and their customers with 
protection from the other’s patents.”). 
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license	on	transfer	situation,	this	article	now	explores	the	application	of	the	bundle	theory	to	other	areas	of	patent	law.		Various	doctrines	in	patent	law	deal	with	the	alteration	of	patent	rights	due	to	actions	by	the	patentee	or	others	interacting	with	the	patent.133		As	it	is	with	patent	licenses,	the	bundle	theory	can	be	useful	in	conceptualizing	the	extent	to	which	such	alterations	travel	with	the	patent	upon	its	transfer.		First	discussed	will	be	patent	exhaustion,	then	FRAND	obligations,	prior	user	rights,	and	finally	laches.			
A.	 Patent	Exhaustion		
The Federal Circuit en banc majority opinion in Lexmark Int’l v. Impression 
Products, included an application of the bundle of sticks conception in the area of patent 
exhaustion.134  The plaintiff, Lexmark, made and sold printers as well as toner cartridges, 
and owned a number of patents covering the cartridges and their use.  The relevant 
cartridges were sold domestically and at a discount but subject to an express single-
use/no-resale restriction.  The defendant, Impression, later acquired the cartridges, not 
directly from Lexmark, but rather after a third party had physically modified them so as 
to enable re-use, in violation of the restriction.  Impression then resold the cartridges, and 
Lexmark sued for patent infringement.  Impression attempted to defend under the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion, arguing that by selling the cartridges, Lexmark had 
																																																								
 
133 Cf. Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 
919 (2016) (“[W]hen I say that patent rights are malleable, I mean that their scope and 
strength can be altered by actors interacting with those rights even after the government 
has issued that right.”). 
 
134 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc), 
certiorari granted (Dec. 2, 2016).  
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exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges and could no longer sue for infringement.  
The en banc majority however found no exhaustion, and in so holding, noted that it “has 
long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights in a particular 
thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an invention – are viewed 
as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred separately.”135 
The Lexmark dissent, however, was of the view that an authorized sale of a 
patented article exhausts the patentee’s property rights in that article, regardless of any 
contractual conditions placed on the sale.136  The Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari in the case, so it is possible that the dissent’s view might ultimately prevail.  In 
urging the Supreme Court to grant the petition for certiorari, the U.S. Solicitor General 
argued in part that the Federal Circuit majority had been guilty of a “failure to distinguish 
between the rights which are given to the inventor by the patent law and which he may 
assert against the world through an infringement proceeding and rights which he may 
create for himself by private contract.”137   
The distinction drawn by the government is not unlike the distinction between the 
license agreement and its effect on the underlying patent rights, precisely the sort of the 
distinction that Hohfeld’s framework can help to flesh out.138  Normally, a patentee 
																																																								
 
135 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 741. 
 
136 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“The right to exclude expires (or is 
‘exhausted’) by an authorized sale.”). 
 
137 Impression Prods., Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1189, Brief For The United 
States As Amicus Curiae, at *8 (Oct. 2016) (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917)). 
 
138 See Part I(C), supra.  
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making an unrestricted sale of a patented article would be giving up the Right to exclude 
with respect to that article.  Whoever owns that article has a Privilege (or “authority”) to 
infringe the patent with that article.139  This Privilege would be unaffected by any 
subsequent transfer of the patent, because the patent owner would transfer the bundle of 
patent rights appropriately diminished, including the “No Rights” correlative to the 
Privileges of those who had purchased patented articles from the previous patentee.  But 
according to the Federal Circuit majority in Lexmark, when a patentee explicitly places 
conditions on the sale (e.g., single use, no resale), the patentee is only giving up the Right 
to exclude provided that the article is used in accordance with those conditions.  Thus the 
patent bundle is diminished to a lesser extent than it would be in the case of an 
unrestricted sale of a patented article.   
The question then is whether restrictions placed on an authorized sale should be 
allowed to lessen the extent to which a patentee parts with its in rem patent rights in the 
article sold, or whether such restrictions are mere in personam agreements between the 
buyer and the seller.  One advantage of the bright line rule urged by the Solicitor General 
and by the dissent would be lower information costs on downstream purchasers of 
patented articles.140   
																																																								
 
139 Id. at 734 (“some sales confer authority on the purchaser to take certain actions – such 
as selling or using the purchased article in the United States or importing it into the 
United States – that would otherwise be infringing acts”). 
 
140 See Part I(B), supra.  See also, Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“Post-
sale restraints would ‘cast a cloud of uncertainty over every sale.’”) (quoting Tessera, Inc. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); Brief For The United 
States, supra, at *14 (“This Court long ago recognized that ‘[t]he inconvenience and 
annoyance to the public’ if patent rights are not exhausted by the first authorized sale are 
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On the other hand, the Lexmark case also seems to raise what J.E. Penner called 
“the question of individuation,” that is, can property be divided any which way (like 
slicing a cake) or is it comprised of certain indivisible base units (like a club is comprised 
of individual people).141  Penner seemed to think that property should be viewed as more 
like the cake.142  The Lexmark majority would allow patentees to control the extent to 
which they part with their patent rights upon sale, whereas the dissent takes more of an 
individuated, all or nothing approach to sales of patented articles. 
B.	 FRAND	Commitments		 Technology	companies	sometimes	seek	to	have	their	patented	inventions	incorporated	into	the	guidelines	promulgated	by	standard	setting	organizations	(SSOs).		In	doing	so,	such	comapanies	promise	that	if	their	invention	is	adopted	into	the	standard,	they	will	license	the	patent	rights	on	fair,	reasonable,	and	non-discriminatory	(FRAND)	terms	to	anyone	who	infringes	due	to	compliance	with	the	standard.		But	what	happens	if	the	company	that	made	the	FRAND	commitment	then	transfers	the	patent?		Is	the	subsequent	patent	owner	bound	by	the	FRAND	commitment?		For	much	the	same	reasons	that	subsequent	patent	owners	are	generally	held	to	be	bound	by	bare	license	commitments,	it	seems	that	the	answer	should	be	yes.		As	Jay	Kesan	and	Carol	Hayes	explain,	“if	a	patentee	could	extinguish																																																																																																																																																																						
‘too obvious to require illustration.’”) (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 
U.S. 659, 667 (1895)).  
 
141 J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 754.  
 
142 Id. (“If we are to take the bundle of rights analysis of property seriously we have to 
believe that the individual rights are like members of a club . . . .  However, as the 
analysis will show, they are merely like slices of a cake, no more than momentary 
functional descriptions made with a particular legal concern in mind.”).  
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the	benefits	of	a	FRAND	commitment	by	transferring	the	patent	to	a	third	party,	this	would	lead	to	inequitable	results.”143			That	is,	if	an	SSO	were	induced	by	a	FRAND	commitment	to	adopt	a	particular	invention	into	the	standard,	it	would	be	inequitable	if	the	FRAND	commitment	could	then	be	shirked	through	a	transfer	of	the	patent.		But	as	with	patent	licenses,	there	is	some	uncertainty	as	to	the	theory	or	mechanism	by	which	a	subsequent	patent	owner	would	be	bound	by	a	previous	owner’s	FRAND	commitment.		Kesan	and	Hayes	primarily	adopt	the	encumbrance	theory,	arguing	in	favor	of	“conceptualiz[ing]	the	FRAND	commitment	as	an	encumbrance	that	runs	with	the	patent,	similar	to	a	servitude	under	real	property	law.”144		They	explain	that	it	is	“fairly	uncontroversial	to	conclude	that	a	FRAND	commitment	relates	to	the	use	of	the	patent,”	and	moreover,	that	subsequent	owners	should	be	considered	to	be	on	notice	because	the	standards	documents	are	publicly	available,	and	“many	SSOs	also	make	FRAND	commitments	publicly	available.”145		They	note	that	the	“primary	hurdle	to	analogizing	to	servitudes	is	that	patents	are	treated	as	having	the	attributes	of	personal	property,	and	servitudes	on	personal	property	are	generally	disfavored	in	the	law,”	but	sidestep	this	hurdle	by	pointing	out	that	the	“law	of	servitudes	has	become	more	liberalized	over	the	years.”146																																																											
 
143 Jay Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and 
Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L. J. 231, 304 (2014).  
 
144 Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 313.  
 
145 Id. at 295. 
 
146 Id. 
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	 The	encumbrance	theory	is	better	suited	for	FRAND	commitments	than	it	is	for	patent	licenses.		The	reason	is	that	practically	the	entire	FRAND	commitment	relates	to	the	patent,	so	it	is	relatively	unproblematic	to	think	of	the	entire	FRAND	commitment	as	running	with	the	patent.		By	contrast,	as	discussed	earlier,	license	privileges	often	arise	from	broad	license	agreements	with	many	different	types	of	in	
personam	commitments.		There	may	be	many	different	patents	involved	in	a	license	agreement	and	many	different	types	of	commitments,	not	all	of	which	will	be	directly	related	to	any	one	patent.		Accordingly,	it	would	not	make	sense	to	have	the	entire	license	agreement	shift	to	a	new	party	with	the	transfer	of	one	patent.		 But	the	FRAND	commitment	could	also	be	conceptualized	using	the	bundle	approach.		The	patent	owner	trades	certain	aspects	of	the	bundle	of	rights	in	exchange	for	adoption	of	the	invention	into	the	standard.		The	FRAND	commitment	can	be	said	to	qualify	the	right	to	exclude	with	respect	to	those	who	use	the	standard,	in	that	“the	patent	owner	cannot	play	the	patent	holdout	game,”147	that	is,	a	patent	owner	seeking	to	enforce	must	be	willing	to	negotiate	a	FRAND	license	with	the	potential	infringer.		And	the	bundle	theory	does	still	accord	better	with	the	treatment	of	patents	as	personal	property	and	the	law’s	disfavoring	of	servitudes	on	personal	property.		Thus	although	the	encumbrance	theory	is	relatively	unproblematic	for	FRAND	commitments,	the	bundle	theory	more	coherently	conceptualizes	such	constraints.		 Indeed,	Kesan	and	Hayes	also	attempt	to	apply	Hohfeld	to	the	FRAND	scenario,	albeit	in	a	different	manner,	stating	that	the	“FRAND	commitment	may	be																																																																																																																																																																						
 
147 Id. at 297. 
Andrew	C.	Michaels	 Patent	Transfer	 DRAFT	–	Dec.	2016		
	 50	
understood	as	imposing	on	the	patent	owner	a	duty	to	negotiate	in	good	faith,	and	through	a	Hohfeldian	analysis,	this	means	that	there	is	a	correlative	right	to	good	faith	negotiation	that	is	held	by	the	potential	licensee.”148		If	such	a	duty	travels	with	the	patent,	this	would	mean	that	all	potential	infringers	would	have	an	affirmative	claim	(e.g.,	breach	of	contract)	against	a	subsequent	patentee	who	did	not	comply	with	the	duty	to	negotiate	in	good	faith.		This	seems	questionable.		For	support,	Kesan	and	Hayes	cite	Apple	v.	Samsung,	where	the	court	stated	that	under	French	law,	“Samsung’s	contractual	obligations	arising	from	its	FRAND	declarations	to	ETSI	at	the	very	least	created	a	duty	to	negotiate	in	good	faith	with	Apple	regarding	FRAND	terms.”149		But	that	case	did	not	involve	a	patent	transfer,	Samsung	was	the	plaintiff	and	the	party	that	made	the	commitment	to	the	SSO	(ETSI).		Samsung	thus	had	a	duty	to	comply	with	its	own	contractual	obligations,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	such	contractual	obligations	necessarily	entirely	travel	with	the	patent.			The	FRAND	commitment	can	be	better	conceptualized	as	the	patentee	giving	up	or	qualifying	its	Rights	to	exclude,	instead	of	as	creating	affirmative	Rights	in	each	of	the	SSO	members.		Thus	the	SSO	members	have	a	Privilege	to	a	negotiated	license	on	FRAND	terms,	rather	than	a	Right	to	negotiation.		The	important	thing	to	the	SSO	members	is	not	negotiation	for	its	own	sake,	rather	it	is	freedom	from	holdout	pressure.		The	Privilege	is	not	an	affirmative	claim,	but	if	a	subsequent	patent	owner	attempts	to	“play	the	holdout	game”	or	sue	an	SSO	member	without																																																									
 
148 Id. at 290.  
 
149 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67201, *43-44 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012).  
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negotiating,	the	SSO	member	may	invoke	the	Privilege	as	a	defense,	thereby	relieving	the	SSO	member	of	holdout	pressure.		As	such,	the	FRAND	obligations	on	patent	owners	are	better	thought	of	as	No	Rights	instead	of	Duties,	as	the	patent	owner	has	no	right	to	play	the	holdout	game.		The	bundle	of	patent	rights	is	thus	diminished,	and	only	the	diminished	bundle	would	transfer	to	a	subsequent	owner.	
C.	 Prior	User	Rights		 Although	it	is	generally	accepted	that	a	patent	provides	only	a	right	to	exclude	and	not	a	right	to	use,150	some	use	rights	may	arise	irrespective	of	the	patent	by	virtue	of	invention	or	prior	use.		The	Supreme	Court	has	stated	that	the	right	of	an	inventor	to	use	its	own	creation	“existed	before	and	without	the	passage	of	law	and	was	always	the	right	of	an	inventor.”151		As	explained	in	the	classic	text	book	by	Albert	H.	Walker:	A	patentee	has	two	kinds	of	rights	in	his	invention.		He	has	a	right	to	make,	use,	and	sell	specimens	of	the	invented	thing;	and	he	has	a	right	to	prevent	all	other	persons	from	doing	either	of	those	acts.		The	first	of	these	rights	is	wholly	independent	of	the	patent	laws;	while	the	second	exists	by	virtue	of	those	laws	alone.152																																																									
 
150 See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, supra, § 16.02[1]; Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 80 F.3d at 
1559.  But see, Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. 321 (2009). 
 
151 Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913); see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 
U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (explaining that the Patent Act of 1800 “may well be deemed merely 
affirmative of what would be the result from general principles of law,” in that it “gives 
the right to the first and true inventor and to him only”).  
 
152 ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT BOOK OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, § 155, 
pg. 193 (5th ed. 1917) (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1852); United States 
v. Bell Telephone Co., 197 U.S. 238 (1897); Jewett v. Atwood Suspender Co., 100 F.R. 
647 (1900); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. The Fair, 123 F.R. 426 (1903)).  
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	Similarly,	William	C.	Robinson	stated:	The	right	conferred	by	the	grant	of	letters-patents	is	the	right	to	the	exclusive	use	of	the	invention	during	a	specific	period	of	time.		This	right	differs,	in	some	respects,	from	the	right	to	the	invention	itself.		The	right	to	the	invention	vests	in	an	the	inventor	by	virtue	of	his	own	creative	act,	and	under	existing	laws	includes	the	right	not	only	to	use	it	without	a	patent,	but	to	obtain	a	patent	for	it	.	.	.	.		The	right	created	by	the	letters-patent	is	collateral	to	the	right	to	the	invention	.	.	.	.153		Given	that	subsequent	independent	creation	is	not	a	modern	day	defense	to	a	claim	of	patent	infringement,	it	seems	that	the	inventor’s	independent	use	right	is	no	longer	in	full	effect.154		But	the	notion	of	use	rights	for	inventors	carries	forward	to	present	day	patent	law	to	some	extent	in	the	form	of	prior	user	rights.		The	America	Invents	Act	provides	a	defense	to	infringement	“based	on	prior	commercial	use.”155		Prior	to	the	AIA,	a	“prior	user	who	did	not	abandon,	suppress,	or	conceal	the	invention,”	could	rely	on	Section	102(g)(2)	to	“invalidate	the	later	patent	of	another	and	thereby	escape	liability	for	infringement.”156		But	with	the	AIA’s	switch	to	a	first-to-file	patent	system,	it	was	necessary	to	enact	the	full	prior	commercial	
																																																								
153 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 2 THE LAW OF PATENTS 6-7, § 420 (1890).   
 
154 See, e.g., Smith, 116 YALE L. J. at 1810 (“Patent law, but not copyright law, gives a 
right against independent invention or creation . . . .”). 
 
155 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2013). 
 
156  See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 48 
(2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), amended by Leahy-Smith American Invents Act of 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
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use	defense	in	order	to	ensure	that	prior	users	could	not	be	forced	to	pay	for	the	continued	use	of	their	own	prior	work.157	If	use	rights	inhere	by	virtue	of	invention	and	are	separate	from	the	patent,	they	should	not	travel	with	the	patent.		Practicing	one	patent	(A)	might	require	the	practice	of	another	blocking	patent	(B).		The	inventor	of	patent	A	might	have	a	prior	user	right	to	practice	patent	B.		But	the	prior	user	right	is	not	granted	by	the	USPTO,	it	is	separate	from	the	patent.		That	is,	the	inventor	of	patent	A	would	have	had	the	prior	user	right	with	respect	to	patent	B	even	if	she	had	never	applied	for	patent	A.		Prior	user	rights	are	personal	to	the	prior	user,	they	are	in	personam.		Thus	the	prior	user	rights	are	not	part	of	the	bundle	of	patent	rights,	and	would	not	travel	to	a	new	patent	owner	upon	transfer	of	the	patent.	
D.	 Laches		 Laches	is	an	equitable	defense	with	a	long	common	law	pedigree,	wherein	courts	of	equity	“refused	its	aid	to	stale	demands,	where	the	party	has	slept	upon	his	right	and	acquiesced	for	a	great	length	of	time.”158		To	invoke	the	defense	of	laches	in	a	patent	case,	the	defendant	must	prove:	(1)	an	unreasonable	delay	in	filing	suit	by	the	patentee,	and	(2)	that	the	delay	operated	to	prejudice	the	accused	
																																																								
157 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., at 48 (“The switch from first-to-invent to first-
inventor-to-file is cited in the legislative history of the AIA as the main impetus behind 
the changes to section 273. (footnote omitted) One of the direct results of adopting a first-
inventor-to-file regime is the elimination of section 102(g)(2) of the current law.”). 
 
158 See, e.g., Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. 638, 29 Eng. Reg. 743 (1767).   
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infringer.159		An	example	of	prejudice	would	be	where	if	the	defendant	had	notice,	it	could	have	switched	to	a	non-infringing	product.160		While	laches	bars	retrospective	relief,	it	as	a	general	matter	does	not	bar	prospective	relief.161					Part	of	the	purpose	of	the	laches	doctrine	is	to	prevent	trolls	from	lurking	under	bridges	until	the	most	opportune	time	to	emerge.		A	hiding	troll	might	induce	a	billy	goat	to	invest	in	walking	towards	a	certain	bridge.162		If	the	troll	had	been	standing	on	top	of	the	bridge,	the	billy	goat	might	have	found	a	different	way	up	the	hillside.		A	patent	troll	might	similarly	lie	in	wait,	deliberately	allowing	a	technology	company	to	accrue	infringement	damages,	whereas	if	the	troll	had	made	its	patent	known,	the	company	might	have	switched	to	a	non-infringing	alternative.		The	Supreme	Court	is	currently	considering	whether	laches	remains	a	defense	in	patent	
																																																								
159 See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 
160 See Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1033; Meyers, 912 F.2d at 1463 (reversing summary 
judgment of laches because the evidence indicated that the accused infringer would have 
continued its development and sales activities regardless of what the patentee did).    
 
161 Auckerman, 960 F.2d at 1040, 1043.  See also, 6A-19 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05 
[3][a](“In terms of the effect on the patent owner’s rights, laches precludes the recovery 
of damages for infringements occurring prior to the filing of suit but not an injunction or 
damages as to post-filing infringements; estoppel bars prospective as well as 
retrospective relief.”); SCA Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., 807 F.3d 1311, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[A] patentee guilty of laches typically does not 
surrender its right to an ongoing royalty.”), certiorari granted, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016). 
 
162 See n.4, supra. 
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litigation.163		If	laches	is	done	away	with,	patent	trolls	will	be	free	to	hide	under	technological	bridges	with	impunity.164				When	a	patent	is	transferred,	the	prior	owner’s	knowledge	of	infringing	activities	is	constructively	imputed	to	the	new	owner.165			As	the	Federal	Circuit	has	explained,	a	“patentee	cannot	avoid	the	consequences	of	his	laches	by	transferring	the	patent.”166		Thus	to	the	extent	that	potential	infringers	have	a	viable	laches	defense	to	a	particular	patent,	that	defense	would	remain	if	the	patent	were	transferred.		As	such,	the	laches	defense	should	be	thought	of	as	altering	the	in	rem	patent	rights	rather	than	as	an	in	personam	defense	against	a	particular	patentee.167			Applying	Hohfeld,	the	laches	defense	is	a	Privilege	to	infringe	without	paying	retrospective	damages.168		The	patentee	thus	has	a	No	Right	to	retrospective	
																																																								
163 SCA Hygiene, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (argued Nov. 1, 2016) (considering whether laches 
should be available to bar claims for legal damages from patent infringement that are 
brought within the six-year limitations period codified at 35 U.S.C. § 286). 
 
164 See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. v. First Quality Baby Prods., No. 15-927, Amicus Brief 
Of Dell, 5 (Sept. 19, 2016) (“NPEs tend to wait to sue, allowing others to build up 
businesses and then claiming a share of the profits (or a payment to go away).”). 
165 See CHISUM, at [2][a][ii] (“It is well-settled that in determining the length of delay, a 
transferee of the patent must accept the consequences of the dilatory conduct of 
immediate and remote transferors.  This includes any charges of infringement or threats 
of suit made by a predecessor.”). 
 
166 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997).  See also, Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (“Lucent’s conduct may be imputed to Defendants for at least some theories of 
unenforceability of patent rights, including laches, estoppel, and inequitable conduct.”). 
 
167 See Rantanen, supra, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. at 919. 
 
168 Cf., SCA Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1332 (“Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is 
different – the patentee has granted a license to use the invention that extends throughout 
the life of the patent.”). 
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damages	(or	only	a	prospective	Right	to	exclude)	against	any	defendant	with	a	bona	fide	laches	defense.		Conduct	giving	rise	to	a	laches	defense,	then,	diminishes	the	bundle	of	patent	rights.		When	the	patent	is	transferred,	under	the	theory	of	this	article,	the	transferor	takes	only	the	diminished	bundle	of	rights.		
Conclusion		 Devices	or	conceptualizations	can	provide	a	way	of	understanding	the	law	in	a	more	coherent	way,	thereby	reducing	uncertainty	in	the	law	and	improving	the	ability	to	accurately	predict	how	the	law	will	or	should	treat	situations	that	might	arise	in	the	future.		One	example	of	a	conceptualization	in	patent	law	is	the	classic	“Winslow	tableau”	device	for	thinking	about	obviousness,	which	is	to	“picture	the	inventor	as	working	in	his	shop	with	the	prior	art	references—which	he	is	presumed	to	know—hanging	on	the	walls	around	him.”169		This	device	may	not	work	perfectly	in	every	case,	but	it	can	be	a	useful	way	of	thinking	about	most	cases.		The	power	of	Newtonian	Physics	to	predict	reality	is	known	to	break	down	at	the	quantum	and	relativistic	levels,	but	nevertheless	it	provides	a	useful	model	for	most	standard	earthly	activities.			The	bundle	theory	provides	a	useful	framework	for	thinking	about	a	variety	of	doctrines	in	patent	law.		Under	this	theory,	the	patent	is	a	bundle	of	rights	(or	sticks)	granted	by	the	USPTO.		Actions	by	the	owner	of	a	patent,	such	as	entering	into	a	license	agreement,	selling	a	patented	article,	or	making	FRAND	commitments,	can	diminish	this	bundle	of	rights,	but	cannot	add	to	it.		The	owner	of	a	patent	can																																																									
169 In re Winslow, 53 C.C.P.A. 1574, 1577 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.). 
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exchange	sticks	in	the	bundle	for	other	forms	of	value.		When	a	patent	is	transferred,	what	is	transferred	is	whatever	remains	in	the	bundle.		That	is,	the	transferred	patent	is	the	original	bundle	of	sticks	granted	by	the	USPTO,	but	appropriately	diminished	by	the	actions	of	the	previous	patent	owners.			Regarding	the	effect	of	patent	transfer	on	patent	licenses,	the	bundle	theory	provides	a	framework	that	is	more	consistent	and	helpful	than	the	prevalent	encumbrance	theory.		And	although	it	does	not	purport	to	be	the	unifying	theory	of	patent	law,	the	bundle	theory	can	provide	a	useful	way	of	thinking	about	some	other	doctrines	in	patent	law	as	well.		Courts	and	litigators	then,	should	consider	making	use	of	the	bundle	framework,	especially	when	faced	with	issues	arising	from	or	related	to	the	transfer	of	patents.		
